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INTRODUCTION
Rules of civil procedure have been examined extensively for their intended
and unintended effects on case outcomes. Little attention, however, has been
given to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) (Rule 52(a))-its clear error stan-
dard of review-and how appellate courts apply or avoid it when examining
substantive legal doctrine. Specifically, when confronted with cases involving
actual malice and intentional race discrimination determinations, courts take
markedly different approaches. While demanding a full reevaluation of facts in
the actual malice context, appellate courts invariably apply the far more defer-
ential clear error standard to a trial court's factual findings regarding inten-
tional race discrimination. This inconsistent approach between intentional race
discrimination and actual malice findings is neither doctrinally sound nor insti-
tutionally defensible.
Rule 52(a) allows an appellate court to set aside trial court factual determi-
nations only if it finds that a trial judge's findings are "clearly erroneous." 2 The
clear error standard is applicable to all cases tried without a jury. Noted consti-
tutional law and federal procedure scholar Charles Alan Wright has asserted
that Rule 52(a) is perhaps the most frequently referenced federal rule of civil
procedure.' It is "ISSUE I" of any appellate brief worth its salt. It is the respon-
dent's opening salvo to the appellate bench, and it is the bane of a petitioner's
colloquy. The rule ties the hands of the appellate court, which is bound not to
reweigh, and certainly not relitigate, the trial court's findings of fact.
To some, the clear error standard of review is a rote, obligatory pro-
nouncement made at an opinion's opening. Others minimize it as irrelevant to
the case merits. 4 As with other procedural or jurisdictional issues, Rule 52(a)
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1. See infra notes 17-22.
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6).
3. 9C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE, CIVIL § 2571, at 225-27 (3d ed. 2008) ("Rule 52(a) is the most frequently
cited of all the rules and usually is cited to justify a refusal to interfere with the
findings of the trial court.").
4. Kevin Casey, Jade Camara & Nancy Wright, Standards of Appellate Review in the
Federal Circuit: Substance and Semantics, n FED. CIR. B.J. 279, 279-8o (2001).
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can be "fiendishly recondite and doctrinaire." 5 Yet, Rule 52(a) is anything but
irrelevant or without far-reaching consequence. Appellate courts may interpret
this seemingly straightforward procedural rule in a manner that has critical im-
plications for constitutional rights and obligations.6
Rule 52(a) interpretation has significant impact on substantive rights and
obligations in two ways. First, much of this impact is in the form of the rarely
considered sub rosa exception: If an appellate court decides that a trial court's
finding is a "constitutional fact," clear error review does not apply! Constitu-
tional facts are those which incorporate or directly compel the application of
constitutional principles.' With constitutional facts, at minimum, de novo re-
view follows. Second, the Supreme Court has insisted that Rule 52(a) must be
applied when reviewing intentional race discrimination, but not actual malice
factual findings. 9 Thus, appellate courts are free to engage in broad reexamina-
tion of trial court determinations where First Amendment rights are implicated
but not where equal protection rights and obligations are at issue.'
This is doctrinally illogical. Both intentional race discrimination and actual
malice entail mens rea determinations of past or present conduct. Both directly
trigger constitutional rights or proscriptions; thus, factual findings articulating
the presence or absence of either intentional race discrimination or actual mal-
ice should be considered constitutional facts. Yet, only actual malice determina-
tions have been deemed constitutional facts for purposes of more searching ap-
pellate review. As constitutional facts, intentional race discrimination
determinations should be reassessed under, at minimum, a de novo standard of
review.
It has been nearly twenty-five years since the Supreme Court established
the rule that in the First Amendment actual malice setting, appellate courts
must make "independent judgment[s]" on the factual findings.1 The Court has
5. FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE 101 (1980).
6. To be sure, standards of review "often impact the appeal more than the facts and
the substantive law issues upon which advocates spend so much time and effort."
Casey et al., supra note 4, at 28o. The appellate rules require advocates to articu-
late the standard of review in briefing. "The appellant's brief must contain, under
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: ... the argument, which must
contain ... for each issue, a concise statement of the applicable standard of review
(which may appear in the discussion of the issue or under a separate heading
placed before the discussion of the issues)." FED. R. App. P. 28.
7. See discussion infra Section II.C.
8. See Adam Hoffman, Corralling Constitutional Fact: De Novo Fact Review in the
Federal Appellate Courts, 5o DUKE L.J. 1427, 1434-35 (2001); see also discussion infra
Section I.A.
9. See discussion infra Section I.A.
1O. See discussion infra Part IV.
11. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984); see discussion
infra Section IV.A.
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yet to clarify this important procedural exception to Rule 52(a). Moreover, the
Court has failed to explain why it refuses to apply independent judgment to all
constitutional facts.'2
When analyzed against the backdrop of the Court's actual malice jurispru-
dence, an unyielding application of Rule 52(a)'s clear error mandate to inten-
tional race discrimination factual findings is not just doctrinally unsound, it is
jurisprudentially untenable. By refusing to apply Rule 52(a)'s constitutional fact
exception to findings of intentional discrimination, the Supreme Court effec-
tively has foreclosed the opportunity for race discrimination jurisprudence to
develop fuller, more robust legal norms. This inconsistent application of the
constitutional fact exception to Rule 52(a) exemplifies the way in which judges
selectively exercise passive versus active virtues when deciding constitutional
cases that have far-reaching legal, social, or political consequences.
Proponents of judicial minimalism and popular constitutionalism'3 urge
passive virtues in judicial decision making. These proponents urge against judi-
cial review and for a "far more modest role for the courts."'' 4 Particularly weigh-
ty issues such as race and rights, it is felt, should be kept within the realm of de-
liberative politics, where law and policy regarding the scope of those rights are
made by duly elected legislators. Perhaps unsurprisingly, judicial decisions re-
12. Other scholars have noted this fact, but none has given it extensive consideration.
See Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth Of The Law-Fact Distinction, 97
Nw. U. L. REV. 1769, 1786 (2003) ("[T]he Court has applied the [constitutional
fact] doctrine in an ad hoc, standardless manner."); Nicki Herbert, Appellate Re-
view of a "Strong Basis in Evidence" in Public Contracting Cases, 77 U. COLO. L.
REV. 193, 213 (2006) ("[Bose] does set forth principles that arguably could be ap-
plied more broadly to cases in which the ultimate decision regards a constitu-
tional right."); Scott Matheson, Jr., Procedure in Public Person Defamation Cases:
The Impact of the First Amendment, 66 TEX. L. REV. 215, 272 (1987) (asking the
question the Bose majority did not answer: "Are appellate courts required to con-
duct an independent examination of the record in all cases involving constitu-
tional issues, or only when the Supreme Court has recently formulated a broad
constitutional standard, or only in first amendment cases?"). But see ROBERT E.
KEETON, KEETON ON JUDGING IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 556 (1999) ("The
implications of the Supreme Court's practice of independent determination are of
great potential significance in the legal system generally and not alone in the pre-
cise contexts in which this practice has developed.").
13. Though a definition of "popular constitutionalism" is elusive, Erwin Chemerinsky
has distilled the common premises from various perspectives on the phrase. Er-
win Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: The Perils of Popular Constitution-
alism, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 673. Common themes that undergird this school of
thought are that judicial review makes little difference, is unnecessary, and is un-
desirable. Id. at 676.
14. Id. at 675.
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garding race and rights are offered as Exhibit A in support of their arguments
against "judicial activism."' 5
Opponents of judicial minimalism, such as scholars Gerald Gunther, John
Hart Ely, or Erwin Chemerinsky, might ask: When is it appropriate to engage in
legal (or for our purposes, rule) interpretation to exhibit active virtues on behalf
of substantive justice?'6 And once the Supreme Court decides to apply actively a
procedural tool such as Rule 52(a)'s constitutional fact exception, as it has done
in the First Amendment setting, should not that application be consistent? This
Article contends that appellate courts should exhibit those active virtues to en-
sure substantive justice in intentional race discrimination cases.
The Supreme Court's approach to Rule 52(a) and its inconsistent applica-
tion of the constitutional fact doctrine merit scrutiny. Many scholars have ad-
dressed procedural doctrines of abstention, 7 standing,'8 ripeness,'9 mootness, °
15. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 196o Term, Foreword: The Pas-
sive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 43 (1961) (arguing that the Court failed to take
advantage of the wide area of choice open in deciding whether, when, and how
much to adjudicate).
16. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
152 (1980) (stating that judicial review exists in part to eradicate "stoppages in the
democratic process," for example, "by invalidating legislation which restricts ...
rights"); Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 683 (critiquing popular constitutional-
ism's underlying assumption that the citizenry can be trusted to protect minori-
ties' rights); Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Com-
ment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-8
(1964) (arguing that passive virtues conceal the basis of judicial decisions and bow
to the countermajoritarian difficulty).
17. See, e.g., C. Douglas Floyd, The ALl, Supplemental Jurisdiction, and the Federal
Constitutional Case, 1995 BYU L. REV. 819 (analyzing the ALI's proposals and their
promise of judicial economy and consistent outcomes); Barry Freidman, A Revi-
sionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MICH. L. REV. 530 (1989) (discussing the results of
federal courts declining to exercise jurisdiction in favor of state court jurisdic-
tion); Lisa Vanderhoof, Indian Law, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 815 (1996) (discussing the
federal jurisdictional inconsistencies that result in confusion and contradiction
with respect to Indian affairs).
18. See, e.g., Roy Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application to
Federal Pleading, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 85 (1994) (analyzing the effects of
race in federal pleading); Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial
Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243 (1999) (arguing against judicial review
of agency rulemaking); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Al-
len v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1985) (discussing standing in cases in which
minorities have challenged exclusionary zoning practices, patterns of police bru-
tality, and judicial or administrative bias); Laura A. Smith, Justiciability and Judi-
cial Discretion: Standing at the Forefront of Judicial Abdication, 61 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1548 (1993) (asserting that the D.C. Circuit has made decisions unduly influ-
enced by the ideological beliefs of its members); Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded
Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1422 (1995) (concluding that the Court is stingier on
standing for racial minorities); Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L.
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subject matter jurisdiction,2' and political question.22 The practical operation of
Rule 52(a) has also been addressed-but only from a practitioner's standpoint. 3
There are four primary reasons urging further analysis.
REV. 612 (2004) (arguing that federal standing outcomes are not inevitably politi-
cal, and at times politics appear to play no role whatsoever); Cass R. Sunstein,
Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1433-34
(1988) (discussing the use of standing as a means to decline exercising proper ju-
risdiction).
19. See, e.g., Michael M. Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in Regula-
tory Takings, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 99 (2000) (discussing the inherent difficulty
and confusion in applying the ripeness doctrine to regulatory takings of land);
David Floren, Pre-Enforcement Ripeness Doctrine: The Fitness of Hardship, 8o OR.
L. REV. 1107 (2001) (outlining the basics of the ripeness doctrine and issues with
its application); Robert Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and the Separation of Powers: A
Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393 (1996) (analyzing ripeness and
political questions).
20. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Book of Manners: How To Conduct a Conver-
sation on Race-Standing, Imperial Scholarship, and Beyond, 86 GEO. L.J. 1051
(1998) (reviewing DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON:
THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997)) (discussing the ap-
propriate way to have a scholarly discussion about race and multiculturalism);
Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability The Example of Mootness, 105
HARV. L. REV. 603 (1992) (arguing for the deconstitutionalization of the mootness
doctrine).
21. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Uma M. Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the Rules
Enabling Act, and the Politicization of the Federal Rules: Constitutional and Statu-
tory Implications, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1303, 1303 (2006) (arguing that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure "have a dramatic impact on fundamental socio-political
and economic concerns.., and concerns of fairness and equality").
22. See, e.g., K. Lee Boyd, Are Human Rights Political Questions?, 53 RUTGERS L. REV.
277 (2001) (discussing political questions); Gunther, supra note 16, at lo (criticiz-
ing the use of ripeness and political question doctrines to decline exercising juris-
diction); Pushaw, supra note 19 (arguing for a reformulation of the political ques-
tion, ripeness, and mootness doctrines in light of traditional federalism
principles).
23. See, e.g., John Blume & Steven Garvey, Harmless Error in Federal Habeas Corpus
After Brecht v. Abrahamson, 35 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 163 (1993) (arguing that
Brecht is only modestly less onerous than Chapman and that any harmless error
rule vests considerable discretion in the sound judgment of the reviewing court);
Michael Bosse, Standards of Review: The Meaning of Words, 49 ME. L. REV. 367
(1997) (demonstrating that searching for the difference between "law" and "fact"
when applying a standard of review is futile); Casey et al., supra note 4, at 279;
Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing and Rationalizing the Resources of
Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645 (1988) (observing how "Rule 52(a)
serves a vital institutional role in allocating the responsibility and the power of de-
cision between district courts and the courts of appeals"); W. Wendell Hall, Revis-
iting Standards of Review in Civil Appeals, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1045 (1993) (discuss-
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First, Rule 52(a) has not been examined from either an institutional or juri-
sprudential perspective.2 4 Second, few commentators have analyzed intentional
race discrimination or its permutations, such as implicit bias or aversive racism,
from an explicitly clear error or constitutional fact perspective. Third, much is
made of judges engaging in judicial activism when the substance of their opin-
ions or their seemingly outcome-determinative reasoning evinces ideological,
social, or political biases. Given Rule 52(a)'s frequent applicability, analysis is
warranted to determine how it might be used to pursue such biases. Fourth,
Professor Jerry Kang has demonstrated how the Supreme Court aggressively
ing the updated standards of review in Texas civil appellate litigation); Kelly
Kunsch, Standard of Review (State and Federal): A Primer, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
11 (1994) (discussing the history and future of the standard of review); Richard
H.W. Maloy, "Standards of Review"-Just a Tip of the Icicle, 77 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 603 (2000) (exploring the standards of review in civil appellate proceedings
and why they exist); Paul R. Michel, Effective Appellate Advocacy, 24 LITIGATION
19 (1998) (identifying the elements of a good appellate brief or oral argument);
Todd E. Pettys, Federal Habeas Relief and the New Tolerance for "Reasonably Erro-
neous" Applications of Federal Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 731 (2002) (analyzing the "un-
reasonably erroneous" standard for courts); Nevin Van de Streek, Why Not "Find-
ings of Law" and "Conclusions of Fact" and Opinions About Both?, 70 N.D. L. REV.
109 (1994) (arguing that the judiciary is misguided in attempting to observe a rigid
and artificial distinction between "findings of fact" and "conclusions of law");
G.K.T., Jr., Note, Rule 52(a): Appellate Review of Findings of Fact Based on Docu-
mentary or Undisputed Evidence, 49 VA. L. REV. 506 (1963) (examining appellate
review under Rule 52(a) of a district judge's findings of fact based upon documen-
tary or undisputed evidence).
24. But see Bryan L. Adamson, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 (a) as an Ideological
Weapon?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1025 (2007) [hereinafter Adamson, Ideological
Weapon]. That article examines Rule 52(a) and the Supreme Court's application
of the clear error standard of review using three cases as examples. While the arti-
cle identifies the Court's inconsistent application of the constitutional fact doc-
trine, it also offers a more explicit and extensive analysis of actual malice and in-
tentional race discrimination doctrines under Rule 52(a). See also Bryan
Adamson, All Facts Are Not Created Equal, 13 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 629
(2004) [hereinafter Adamson, All Facts] (analyzing the Sixth Circuit's Grutter v.
Bollinger opinion to determine whether invoking the constitutional fact doctrine
was appropriate or necessary); Charles Richard Calleros, Title VII and Rule 52(a):
Standards of Appellate Review in Disparate Treatment Cases-Limiting the Reach of
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 58 TUL. L. REV. 403 (1983) (arguing that whether a tri-
al court finding is one of "fact" for purposes of Rule 52(a) should be determined
in light of policy considerations as well as a literal definition of the term "fact");
John F. Nangle, The Ever Widening Scope of Fact Review in Federal Appellate
Courts-Is the "Clearly Erroneous Rule" Being Avoided?, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 409
(1981) (discussing how appellate courts are increasingly widening their scope of
review beyond the strictures of the "clearly erroneous" standard); Charles A.
Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751 (1957)
(discussing how appellate courts use standards of review to transfer judicial power
away from trial courts).
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"deployed procedure-like tools to achieve substantive results"-namely, abet-
ting the government's internment of Japanese-Americans and avoiding "the
countermajoritarian difficulty."25 A close examination of Rule 52(a) is needed in
order to determine whether appellate courts' passive approach to intentional
race discrimination claims, an approach signified by hewing to the clear error
standard of review, is another example of courts' avoiding the countermajori-
tarian difficulty. 6
Appellate court avoidance of that difficulty where intentional race dis-
crimination determinations are under review ultimately marginalizes equal pro-
tection claims. 7 This unprincipled approach to constitutional adjudication ex-
emplifies yet another subtle vice of passive virtues." This Article challenges the
Court's own words: If a reviewing court must "exercise its own independent
judgment" on constitutionally significant facts in actual malice cases,2 9 then ap-
25. Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial, 51 UCLA L. REV.
933, 958 (2004). Kang deconstructs the Japanese internment cases to demonstrate
the Supreme Court's use of procedural tools to achieve and affirm racism. Profes-
sor Catherine Struve argued that the Supreme Court has ignored the Rules Ena-
bling Act's "substantive ri.ght S " p uvi si n b y ria :111 to0 11-1va1uaL: .... Ir ..... • If p rce-
dure which clearly impinge upon such rights, and she also asserts that its
interpretation of rules in order to avoid the operation of their text and advisory
notes is unjustified under the Act. Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation:
Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1141-69
(2002). Additionally, Professors Gulati and McCauliff examined appellate use of
Judgment Orders, and illustrated that, as a matter of practice, even stated proce-
dural rules are not observed and that judges use informal norms to avoid opinion
writing on the "hard" cases. Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making
Law, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 162, 164 (1998); see also Joseph L. Smith &
Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law, 31 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 61 (2002)(providing empirical support for the argument that federal
appellate judges, for example, routinely choose the process instrument over statu-
tory interpretation to reverse administrative agencies and insulate their favored
decisions from further review by higher courts).
26. This analysis and critique view intentional race discrimination through a Rule
52(a) analysis. This Article's approach, however, would apply equally to inten-
tional discrimination toward any member of a suspect class. Furthermore, while
this Article examines intentional race discrimination from a constitutional van-
tage point, appellate courts should make independent judgments upon statutorily
proscribed discrimination as well.
27. It is important to emphasize that this Article does not attempt to discuss, nor ap-
ply, the constitutional avoidance doctrine to rules of procedure. It is not the case
that appellate courts do not address the constitutional question because it is un-
necessary to reach, but, instead, they avoid it when they should be reaching it.
z8. Gunther, supra note 16.
29. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 5O n.17 (1984).
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pellate courts have an equally critical constitutional responsibility toward inten-
tional race discrimination matters arising under the Equal Protection Clause.3
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the appellate courts' cre-
ation of fact "types" which act as exceptions to Rule 52(a)'s application and how
that same typology creates the avenue by which the clear error standard affects
substantive rights. Rule 52(a)'s clear error standard is explicated in Part II to
demonstrate clearly how it operates in comparison to de novo review and re-
view for the purpose of making an independent appellate judgment. Insofar as
standards of review serve important jurisprudential interests, Part III attempts
to illuminate institutional values advanced by Rule 52(a)'s clear error standard
of review and the constitutional fact doctrine. Part IV explicates the way in
which the Supreme Court has privileged the actual malice doctrine yet has firm-
ly relegated intentional race discrimination doctrine to Rule 52(a)'s standard.
The Article concludes by asserting how Rule 52(a), both on its own terms and in
its inconsistent application, works a substantial injustice for intentional race
discrimination claims.
I. THE (RULE 52(A)) STANDARD CONTINGENCIES
Rule 52(a) defines the standard of review 3' for factual findings in cases tried
by the bench. Rule 52(a)(6) directs that: "Findings of fact, whether based on
oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the
reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge
the witnesses' credibility.13 2 Although adopted in 1938, the roots of Rule 52(a) lie
in the Constitution. Article III originally conferred federal jurisdiction over
30. This Article considers intentional discrimination in the subjectivist sense, i.e., ac-
cording to motive, purpose, and mens rea. The subjectivist approach incorporates
the "animus" or "illicit motive" types of discrimination, which call for direct or
circumstantial evidence regarding an actor's state of mind. Michael Selmi, Proving
Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279,
288 (1997). This Article also includes intentional discrimination contingent upon
proof through negligence or impact. Cf. Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256 (1979). This Article, however, does not address intentional discrimination as
an element of causation. Under a causal claim, the inquiry is not into the subjec-
tive state of mind but rather objective evidence exists supporting an inference that
"an impermissible factor such as race served as the impetus for the challenged ac-
tion." Selmi, supra, at 294 (footnote omitted).
31. At this juncture, it is helpful to clarify what standard of review means. A standard
of review is an articulated limit up to which an appellate court will review findings
of fact, conclusions of law, or rulings. Standard of review also is used in a nar-
rower sense when referring to the level of scrutiny accorded matters that implicate
constitutional rights or obligations impacting a suspect class (e.g., rational basis,
intermediate, and strict). The scope of review, by distinction, refers to the range of
issues an appellate court will examine 'o determine the soundness of the trial
court's ruling.
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6).
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questions of both law and fact.33 When Article III was being drafted, debate
arose over the power of federal courts to determine the proper form and scope
of appellate review. 34 At that time, appellate courts could review actions at law
only for legal error; actions in equity, in which evidence was taken in the form
of documents and depositions, were reheard de novo.35 Rule 52(a), in its initial
form, was drafted subsequent to the Rules Enabling Act, through which Con-
gress empowered the Supreme Court to promulgate the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 36 Rule 52(a) effectively extended equity practice in nonjury cases to
actions at law with one exception: Factual findings were to be treated as conclu-
sive.37 Rule 52(a) thus originated through an attempt to establish the respective
roles of trial and appellate courts and to allocate power and authority between
those two tribunals with regard to factual determinations and law declaration.
As a general proposition, standards of review confine appellate inquiry and
judgments within a discrete decisional framework. For example, by directing
that facts found by a trial court be reviewed only for clear error, Rule 52(a)
binds the appellate judge to respond to the facts in a particular way and not to
engage in a more active inquiry. 3 Given the inability to draw clear distinctions
between law and fact, however, Rule 52(a) has proved to be an inherently im-
perfect mechanism with which to allocate power and authority between the two
tribunals.
A. The Law-Fact "Dichotomy"
Whether Rule 52(a)'s clear error standard or some other standard of review
should apply depends heavily upon the law-fact "distinction." "Law" can be de-
33. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ("In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other pub-
lic Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme
Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the
supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with
such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.").
34. Charles E. Clark & Ferdinand F. Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, 4 U. CHI. L.
REV. 190, 192-94 (1937).
35. See Adamson, Ideological Weapon, supra note 24, at 1038-39.
36. Adopted in 1934, the Act gave the Supreme Court the power to create greater in-
stitutional uniformity by promulgating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). The Act has its roots in English equity practice, which de-
veloped a substantive doctrine to extend the common law practice, as evidenced
by the emergent rules' liberal pleading requirements and class action provisions.
Matheson, supra note 12, at 223; see also Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and "Pro-
cedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 325 (discussing the debate
surrounding the retention of the Act's super-session provision at § 2072(b)).
37. Cooper, supra note 23, at 647-48.
38. Whether formal or informal, rules not only guide behavior but also can act as
monitors. Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 25, at 168.
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fined as articulations of rules, policies, norms, or edicts that serve to guide so-
cial conduct that are applied in any given case or controversy. 9 A "fact," in its
broadest sense, can be regarded as a descriptive claim "about some feature of
the physical, mental, or moral world."40
In the adjudicative setting, there are two types of findings of fact: historical
facts and evaluative facts. 41 Historical facts are "assertions about acts, events, or
sets of conditions of the past or present." 42 Historical facts can describe "what
exists, in contrast with what should, rightfully, exist," 43 regardless of their accep-
tance within the adjudication context.44 Determinations of actual malice and
intentional discrimination rely upon accounts of past or present acts, events, or
conditions. Importantly, both are located through assessments of individual
motive and conduct-manifested subjectively or objectively, or through direct
or circumstantial evidence. Consequently, actual malice and intentional dis-
crimination findings are paradigmatic historical facts.
Evaluative facts are inferences or conclusions articulated out of historical
facts. To use an illustrative, if slightly oversimplified, hypothetical: "Mr. Jones,
an African-American, was employed by the State of Ohio Division of Financial
Institutions for twenty years. Recently, there was an announcement that layoffs
would occur. Layoffs were conducted pursuant to the state's layoff procedures
manual, which sets forth three grounds for conducting layoffs: 1) lack of funds;
2) decrease in division workload; or 3) abolishment of a position through reor-
ganization. Mr. Jones was the only African-American in that division. His su-
39. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 900 (8th ed. 2004).
40. Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 859, 863 (1992).
41. In addition, the law recognizes predictions of future acts and evaluative predic-
tions. KEETON, supra note 12, § 2.8, at 47.
42. Id. at 46. Within the legal setting, "historical facts" are sometimes referred to as
"adjudicative" facts. Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legis-
lative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV. 111, 113 (1988).
43. Woolhandler, supra note 42, at 114 (quoting JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMI-
NARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE OF THE COMMON LAW 191 (1898)).
44. The existence of a historical fact is not contingent upon its acceptance in the ad-
judicative setting. Even if we might reach consensus on the existence of a given
fact, its use in cases or controversies turns upon relevance, significance, accep-
tance, and, ultimately, admissibility. Lawson, supra note 40, at 867-68 ("Our legal
system structures the justificatory inquiry for factual claims of this kind to address
three different, though potentially overlapping, epistemological problems, which I
call the problem of admissibility, the problem of significance, and the problem of
weight or magnitude.") A broader view of what constitutes a historical fact should
be considered, especially in light of how "facts" regarding race discrimination of-
ten are deemed inadmissible by some fact-finders (e.g., that a party engaged in
unconscious bias). This broader view is central to any argument in favor of an ex-
panded acceptance of what it means to engage in intentional discrimination. See
discussion infra Section IV.B.
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pervisor, Mr. Smith, who is white, terminated Mr. Jones pursuant to the layoff
process." These are descriptions of historical facts-observable, objectively
stated, verifiable events. Additional facts are that the Division of Financial Insti-
tutions did not receive decreased funding, that the workload was consistent,
and that no specific positions were to be abolished. Moreover, with an under-
standing that Mr. Jones was never absent, received high evaluations, and never
had a dispute with any superior or coworker, one might infer that Mr. Jones
was a "model employee." In light of that inference, another possible conclusion
could be that Mr. Smith terminated Mr. Jones "because of his race."
In the adjudicative setting, those evaluative facts are then applied to deter-
mine whether they satisfy the requirements of the applicable legal standards of
the relevant rule.45 It is within the process of constructing historical facts into
evaluative statements where any fact-law distinction can become clouded. To
make an evaluative statement that "Mr. Smith discriminated against Mr. Jones
when he fired him because of his race" is to apply the factual inferences to a le-
gal proscription (nondiscrimination).
This example illustrates that any distinction between law and fact is more
theoretical than real.46 There are four principal reasons. First is the epistemo-
logical quandary that emerges whenever one attempts to define a "fact": Must it
be true, or objectively verifiable?4 To revisit the hypothetical, one can debate
philosophically what it means to be an "African-American" or "white." 48 Sec-
ond, articulating a finding of fact, as trial judges are bound to do, is not as easy
as it might seem because of the inexactness of words themselves. To refer to Mr.
Jones as an "employee" is not to make a "pure" statement of historical fact be-
cause the term itself rests upon several factual premises and is imbued with legal
45. KEETON, supra note 12, § 2.8, at 46.
46. See Forrest G. Alogna, Double Jeopardy, Acquittal Appeals, and the Law-Fact Dis-
tinction, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1131, 1154 (2001) (noting the "'elusive' character of a
technique for distinguishing fact from law") (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104,
113 (1985)); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 408 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("[Ilt is sometimes difficult to distinguish a mixed question of law
and fact from a question of fact ..."); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 11O-11
(1995) ("[T]he proper characterization of a question as one of fact or law is some-
times slippery."); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401 (1990); Mil-
ler, 474 U.S. at 113 (1985) ("[D]istinguishing questions of fact from questions of
law has been, to say the least, elusive."). But see Allen & Pardo, supra note 12, at
1770 ("ITlhe only distinction [between law and fact] is a functional one: [deter-
miningl ... which body does or should decide on issues and under what stan-
dard ...."); Lawson, supra note 40, at 863 ("[Tlhe law-fact distinction, whatever
its utility, is purely a creature of convention.").
47. See Walter Wheeler Cook, "Facts" and "Statements of Fact," 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 233,
237 (1936); Lawson, supra note 40, at 866 ("[A fact] is a reality that exists inde-
pendently of its acknowledgment by the consciousness of a perceiver.").




character. Thus, it is an evaluative term itself. Third, "fact" and "law" do not
occupy two separate ontological spheres, nor are they truly analytically dis-
tinct.49 For example, to say that "the Equal Protection Clause prohibits dis-
crimination" is to describe a law that exists as a matter of fact."°
Fourth, and most important, some factual findings, such as the existence
or absence of "discrimination" or "actual malice," directly trigger the applica-
tion of legal norms. When such findings are articulated in a manner that incor-
porates the legal standard against which it is evaluated, factual findings come to
resemble "mixed statements of fact and law"-"constitutional," "ultimate,"
"legislative," or "sociological" facts.' At this juncture, a brief description of
mixed statements of fact and law and of constitutional, ultimate, legislative, and
sociological facts is warranted.
A mixed statement of fact and law is one in which "pure" evaluative facts
are intertwined with indicia of legal principles."2 Constitutional, ultimate, legis-
lative, and sociological facts are specific types of mixed statements of fact and
law. Constitutional facts are those with magnitudes that embody explicit and
implicit principles of the Constitution. Facts peculiar to a dispute are examined
under the relevant constitutional rule to determine whether a right exists or an
obligation has been met.5 3 As with any fact type, however, constitutional facts
are not always apparent. Often, it is the inference from subsidiary facts estab-
lished, i.e., the evaluative fact, that becomes the constitutional fact. The state-
ments "Mr. Smith intentionally discriminated against Mr. Jones when he fired
him because of his race" or "journalist Jane Doe published her article with ma-
licious intent" are not just articulations of constitutional facts; they are ultimate
facts. An ultimate fact is one that, when applied to a legal standard, directly
triggers legal consequence. Such a fact "must be sufficient in itself, without in-
ferences or comparisons, or balancing of testimony, or weighing evidence, to
49. See Allen & Pardo, supra note 12, at 1776.
50. Cf Lawson, supra note 40, at 863. ("From an epistemological perspective, every
positive propositional claim about the law in the form 'the law is X' is a factual
claim of one sort or another.").
51. To be sure, "mixed" statements of fact and law highlight the "distinction's impor-
tance and its unruly nature." Allen & Pardo, supra note 12, at 1779.
52. Mixed statements of fact and law can be described as "questions in which histori-
cal facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is
whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or, to put it another way, whether
the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated." Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982).
53. See David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Em-
pirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 553 (1991)
("Courts examine constitutional-review facts under the pertinent constitutional
rule in order to determine the constitutionality of the state's action. Finally, con-
stitutional cases oftentimes involve adjudicative facts-facts peculiar to the dis-
pute and which must be examined under the pertinent constitutional rule.").
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
justify the application of the legal principles which must determine the case."54
An ultimate fact may also compel a determination that a constitutional edict or
a statutory, regulatory, or common law rule was or was not violated. It also may
compel a legislative or sociological judgment. 5
Legislative facts are relevant to formulating a legal principle or ruling56
Legislative facts can inform a court's legislative judgment or a law or policy, and
they can be distinguished further as sociological, political, economic, scientific,
or historical (as a body of knowledge).57 As distinguished from historical facts,
legislative facts are predictions in the sense that they are less knowable. 8 To
draw an even finer point, legislative facts are "typically predictions about the
relative importance of one factor in causing a complex phenomenon."5 9
Legislative facts can be specific to a case or can establish legal norms that
extend beyond the case at hand.6" Legislative facts may serve an adjudicatory
54. Burr v. Des Moines R.R. & Navigation Co., 68 U.S. 99, 102 (1863); see also Pull-
man-Standard, 456 U.S. at 286 n.16 (defining an ultimate fact as the "legally de-
terminative consideration").
55. See Adamson, Ideological Weapon, supra note 24, at 1056.
56. See Faigman, supra note 53, at 552; Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar
Things: Deciding Disputed Premise Facts, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1, 10 (1988). See gener-
ally Peggy C. Davis, "There Is a Book Out... ": An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of
Legislative Facts, loo HARV. L. REV. 1539 (1987); A.J. Stephani, Therapeutic Juris-
prudence in the Appellate Arena: Judicial Notice and the Potential of the Legislative
Fact Remand, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 509 (2000). Legislative facts also refer to the
decision-making process of the courts. Id. at 518-19. Legislative facts might also re-
fer to the lawmaking process of a legislative body. Laws of other jurisdictions, spe-
cial rules, ordinances, and judicial opinions also are termed legislative facts even
though they are treated as adjudicative facts for judicial notice purposes. See FED.
R. EvID. 201(a).
57. See, e.g., Mueller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (illustrating the concept of a so-
ciological fact by holding, based on sociological studies, that because of "inherent"
differences between the sexes, factories could limit women's work hours); Stan-
dard-Vacuum Oil Co. v. United States, 339 U.S. 157, 159 (1950) (typifying a histori-
cal fact through a statement about Japanese control of the Philippine Islands from
May 1942 until October 1944); Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 467 F.3d 716
(8th Cir. 2006) (describing a scientific fact by holding that no scientific consensus
exists on when a fetus becomes a human being); Gafoor v. INS, 231 F. 3d 645, 656
(9th Cir. 2000) (exemplifying the concept of a political fact through the 2000 up-
rising in Fiji); In re Asbestos Litigation, 829 F.2d 1233 (3d Cir. 1987) (demonstrat-
ing an economic fact by holding that denying state-of-the-art defense to asbestos
manufacturers does not constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
58. KEETON, supra note 12, § 19.6.4, at 540-41.
59. Woolhandler, supra note 42, at 114.
60. Legislative facts are introduced into controversies, either by litigants or by judicial
notice. In addition, trial or appellate judges themselves may inject legislative facts
into the cases on their own. Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 201 are particularly
28:1 2009
CRITICAL ERROR
function within a particular legal controversy, what I term an "adjudicative-
legislative fact." An adjudicative-legislative fact is one that decides an issue in a
way that would have "no substantive implications beyond the specific case in
which it is introduced."'" For example, in his case against the State of Ohio, Mr.
Jones may introduce a survey conducted by a third party evidencing the conclu-
sion that Mr. Smith fostered a work environment hostile to minorities. Legisla-
tive facts may also make law or encourage a trial judge to establish a particular
rule, which I call a "law-legislative fact." A law-legislative fact might not solely
influence case-specific outcomes but still carry the power of normative, prece-
dential recognition as law.62 Whether a case-specific or a general normative as-
sertion, no legal norm is presumed to exist.6"
It is useful here to illustrate how a law-legislative fact might be established.
In the Smith and Jones example, a trial judge might conclude that "while Mr.
Smith's racial bias was not explicit, he harbored a type of implicit bias that ul-
timately led to Mr. Jones's unlawful firing." Underneath that conclusion is the
premise that the judge has adopted evidence designed to create rules but nar-
rowed its application to the case-specific context. Were the judge to recast that
conclusion to say that "all human beings engage in both conscious and uncon-
scious bias," she would elevate the legislative fact to a normative proposition
with potentially far-reaching implications. Because legislative facts do not pre-
relevant to legislative facts. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 allows for expert testi-
mony. It states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a wit-
ness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise .. " FED. R. EVID. 702.
Findings that emerge through Rule 702 testimony can illuminate issues in a mat-
ter or establish a legal norm to guide future controversies. See also FED. R. EVID.
704(a) (Testimony "in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is
not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier
of fact"). Federal Rule of Evidence 201 allows for judicial notice of a legislative fact
so long as it is not "subject to reasonable dispute." FED. R. EvID. 201.
61. Stephani, supra note 56, at 520-21 (quoting John Monahan & Laurens Walker, So-
cial Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U.
PA. L. REV. 477, 485 (1986)). But see United States v. Bello, 194 F.3d 18, 22 (lst Cir.
1999) (noting that "[w]hether a fact is adjudicative or legislative depends not on
the nature of the fact. . . but rather the use made of it (i.e., whether it is a fact ger-
mane to what happened in the case or a fact useful in formulating common law
policy or interpreting a statute) ....") (emphasis added).
62. Legislative facts introduced to prove case-specific propositions will take on nor-
mative characteristics if used to support a new legal norm. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Henry Wolf Bikle, Judicial Determination of
Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action, 38
HARV. L. REV. 6 (1924).
63. Woolhandler, supra note 42, at 114 (stating that legislative facts "do not presume a
pre-existing legal norm because by definition such facts are used to create law").
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sume any existing legal norm, standard of review decisions are contingent upon
their presence.
The phenomenon of implicit bias can be understood as a more specific type
of legislative fact, a sociological fact. A sociological fact is a "proposition[] that
[is] general in nature and describe[s] the status or condition of a subject. ' '6 4 So-
ciological facts are most often located through articulations of experts or other
learned observations. The theory that people engage in implicit bias or stereo-
typing is to accept the premise that has been demonstrated in psychological lit-
erature and cited, with limited impact, in appellate decisions.6 5 In reference to
the hypothetical once again, to frame discrimination against Mr. Jones in terms
of sociological facts potentially could have precedential impact. Other examples
of sociological facts include the conclusions that segregation has a pernicious
impact on African-American children's self-esteem and performance, 66 that
"juries are less likely to impose the death penalty when life without parole is
available as a sentence,' '6, that "[s]exual behavior is not necessarily a good pre-
dictor of one's sexual orientation,"68 and that juveniles are less susceptible to
deterrence measures because they are less likely to engage in a reasoned cost-
benefit analysis assigning any weight to serious reprisals.6 9 Like law-legislative
facts, sociological facts compel application of a heightened standard of review.
In sum, when a trial court articulates findings of constitutional, ultimate,
legislative, or sociological facts-mixed statements of law and fact-it does
more than make ordinary, objective factual determinations. If one imagines a
"law" (as articulations of rules and norms) at one end of a continuum and
"fact" at the other, mixed statements of law and fact can lie at any point on the
continuum. Thus, what Professor Henry Monaghan observed in one of the
more influential articles on constitutional facts is quite apt: Fact and law are re-
64. Adamson, Ideological Weapon, supra note 24, at 1O60 n.2o2.
65. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 267-68 (2005) (acknowledging but ulti-
mately rejecting unconscious racial bias as a possible ground for the prosecutor's
use of peremptory challenges against African-American venire members); United
States v. Cherry, 5o F.3d 338, 343-44 (1995) (acknowledging that subconscious ra-
cism may have had an effect on the enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines-which prescribed tougher sentences for those convicted of crack cocaine
offenses versus powder cocaine offenses-but finding that appellant failed to link
such racism to the law's enactment). But see Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,
487 U.S. 977, 990-91 (1988)(acknowledging that even if Title VII could guard
against subjective decisions made by supervisors, "problems of subconscious ste-
reotypes would remain[,]" and such latent racism was a form of discrimination
that the statute was designed to prohibit).
66. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 & n.l.
67. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1547 (20o8) (Stevens, J., concurring).
68. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 264 n.i
(6th Cir. 1999).
69. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571-72 (2005).
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ally not "static, polar opposites" but exhibit a nodal quality as "points of rest
and relative stability on a continuum of experience." ° As facts move along the
fact-law continuum, they begin to take on characteristics more akin to legal
rules or norms. Simultaneously, appellate standard of review choices move
along the continuum to exact greater scrutiny of factual determinations. To
characterize a finding of intentional race discrimination as a constitutional or
ultimate fact is to move it towards "law." Similarly, to characterize implicit bias
as a legislative or sociological fact implicates a standard of review other than
clear error. Although framed by a trial court as facts found, such pronounce-
ments should be deemed as either law declaration or assertions seeking some
normative recognition as law. Because of the normative implications of such
conclusions, appellate courts are empowered to reevaluate the evidence in order
to support or refute their validity. 7' Given the well-established role of appellate
courts to "say what the law is,"72 appellate courts should engage in heightened
review of such facts.
B. The Procedure-Substance "Dichotomy"
As with the law-fact dichotomy, a procedure-substance dichotomy cannot
always be framed as one involving static, polar opposites. The Rules Enabling
Act's drafters attempted to distinguish procedure from substance. While neither
term is intuitively accessible, procedure is defined best as setting forth the proc-
esses that govern the function and administration of courts and cases. 73 Sub-
stance-or more specifically, the "substantive rights" identified in the Act-
refer to the law and the application of the law to the facts in controversy.74 Even
70. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 233
(1985).
71. Appellate courts may review trial findings based on sociological facts de novo. See,
e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986). Without deciding the standard of
review, the Court stated that it was "far from persuaded" that Rule 52(a) would
apply to the social science evidence admitted at trial to demonstrate juror biases.
Id. at 168-69 n.3.
72. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
73. Redish & Amuluru, supra note 21, at 1305 ("[A procedural rule is] internal to the
operation of the judiciary; it has no impact outside the four walls of the court-
house.").
74. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). The Rules Enabling Act clause that states that "[s]uch
rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right" was added by
Senator Albert Cummins in the early drafting stages of the Equity Act out of con-
cerns that the Rules Enabling Act would give courts the ability to legislate. Redish
& Amuluru, supra note 21, at 13o6; see also Stephen Burbank, The Rules Enabling
Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1028 (1982) ("[Tlhe Act's procedure/substance
dichotomy was intended to allocate lawmaking power between the federal gov-
ernment and the states.").
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if the procedure-substance distinction did not seem fallacious at the time,75 in
hindsight it is obvious that any distinction lies only at the margins. What is
clear is that procedural rules and substantive rights can operate interdepen-
dently. Importantly, as procedural rules begin to incorporate substantive con-
siderations, as with the fact-law continuum, heightened appellate standard of
review choices are triggered.
A distressingly powerful example of this can be seen when considering the
impact of Rule ii on substantive civil rights claims. Rule 11 allows judges to im-
pose penalties upon lawyers and individuals if they have, among other activity,
presented pleadings or other papers to the court for "any improper purpose,
such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of liti-
gation," or if they have presented contentions without evidentiary support. 76
Several studies have found that a disproportionate number of civil rights cases
were the subject of Rule 11 sanctions. 77 Furthermore, federal civil rights claims
are subjected to heightened pleading requirements7' even though they often are
premised upon facts and evidence not within the province or possession of the
plaintiff. Consequently, a civil rights plaintiff is more vulnerable to Rule ii sanc-
tions or 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss and thus risks being foreclosed and chilled
from pursuing substantive redress.
Procedural rules and substantive rights operate interdependently under
Rule 52(a) to disadvantage intentional race discrimination claims as well. The
clear error standard purportedly applies to all facts, no matter the type. Thus,
on its face, Rule 52(a) limits the authority of appellate courts to reexamine the
facts that inform the substantive rights at issue in a given case. As it becomes
75. See Carrington, supra note 36, at 284 ("[Slubstance and procedure differ even if, at
the margin, they become difficult to distinguish."); Walter Wheeler Cook, "Sub-
stance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Law, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 336 n.io (1933)
("The distinction between substantive and procedural law is artificial and illusory.
In essence, there is none.").
76. FED. R. Civ. P. 1(b)(i), (b)(3).
77. Three studies revealed that "the percentage of sanction requests in civil rights cas-
es was disproportionately high relative to the number of civil rights cases in the
total caseload," and in one, "civil rights cases were targeted under Rule ii more
than twice as frequently as would be expected." Mark Spiegel, The Rule n Studies
and Civil Rights Cases: An Inquiry into the Neutrality of Procedural Rules, 32 CONN.
L. REV. 155, 171 (1999).
78. Federal courts traditionally have required specificity in pleading or heightened
pleading of plaintiffs bringing § 1983 civil rights actions. Subsequent cases held
that "heightened pleading was not to be applied in civil rights cases against mu-
nicipalities," and one scholar notes that "the application of heightened pleading in
actions against individual agents is inconsistent [with the requirements for mu-
nicipal defendants]." Paula Wolff, Propriety and Effect of Heightened Standards of
Pleading or Production Required of Plaintiff in Action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, 144
A.L.R. FED. 427 (1998). As a consequence, plaintiffs failing to adhere to the re-
quirements are denied their day in court.
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crucial to identify the type of fact, however, Rule 52(a) "can produce errors of
over-inclusiveness."7 9 The typology that animates the term "fact," as used in
Rule 52(a), carries profound substantive consequences. In particular, a determi-
nation that a fact is a constitutional one compels departure from the rule be-
cause it introduces other institutional goals into the equation-specifically, the
need to give doctrinal coherence to constitutional legal norms. To label a trial
court finding as a constitutional, ultimate, legislative, or sociological fact is to
trigger, at a minimum, de novo review. Consequently, although Rule 52(a) and
its clear error standard might constrain appellate judges, its power is not con-
clusive. Unfortunately, its power is conclusive as to intentional race discrimina-
tion findings, because appellate courts refuse to apply any standard other than
clear error to such determinations.
Given that Rule 52(a) dictates the level of scrutiny an appellate court will
give factual determinations made by the court below, decisions about its appli-
cability can be the primary factor in determining outcomes. Fact types operat-
ing beneath Rule 52(a) fortify the interplay between the clear error standard of
review and the substantive rights being litigated. Relevantly, the constitutional
fact doctrine acts as both a procedural and substantive concept-demanding a
heightened standard of review and requiring reexamination of the factual de-
terminations and the underlying premises of those determinations.
A discussion of law-fact distinctions illuminates how intentional discrimi-
nation and actual malice determinations should be examined on appeal. Both
are paradigmatic examples of pure historical fact inquiry. Thus, factual findings
based upon intentional discrimination or actual malice should be located on the
same point of the fact-law continuum. On appeal, however, courts evaluate ac-
tual malice determinations as constitutional facts, while they review factual
findings that articulate the presence or absence of intentional discrimination
only for clear error.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Despite the imperfections of the fact-law and procedure-substance distinc-
tions, Rule 52(a) attempts to create a bright line. As a general proposition, a rule
can be relatively straightforward and apply to all similarly situated parties. As
Kathleen Sullivan has described, a rule "binds a decisionmaker to respond in a
determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts" and "aim[s] to
79. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 1o6 HARV. L. REV. 22, 56 (1992). Catherine Struve has set
forth the theoretical sources of the Supreme Court's power to interpret proce-
dural rules by balancing policy arguments for or against a particular interpreta-
tion. Discretion to interpret procedural rules is inherent because the Supreme
Court itself promulgates those rules. Struve, supra note 25, at 1124-32. She even
makes the case as to how lower federal courts have "felt free to strain the Rules'
text and ignore relevant Notes, in order to implement their own views of desirable
policy." Id. at 1119.
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confine the decisionmaker to facts, leaving irreducibly arbitrary and subjective
value choices to be worked out elsewhere. " "8 Rule 52(a) embodies a presump-
tion of finality to factual findings and purports to prevent appellate judges from
"scrutiniz[ing] factors irrelevant to the rule's applicability."8' But, as we have
seen, decisional tools such as the constitutional fact doctrine and other Rule
52(a) exceptions allow judges to do just that, i.e., scrutinize trial court findings
despite Rule 52(a)'s clear error mandate.
A. Clear Error Review
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co. provides the most commonly cited justifi-
cation for overturning a trial court's factual findings: Clear error exists when an
appellate court, allowing that the trial court's determination is supported by
some evidence, is nonetheless left "with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed" after reviewing all of the evidence.82 The Gypsum
admonition has as much (or as little) intrinsic meaning as the term it attempts
to define.8" Consequently, subsequent appellate courts have offered variations
on the Gypsum definition.
A trial court's factual findings are clearly erroneous if they are "without
adequate evidentiary support, '8 4 are without "sufficient evidence,"8 or if "rea-
sonable men could not possibly make such a finding."86 Moreover, if the find-
ings are "completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support,"8 7 if they have
"no rational relationship to the supportive evidentiary data,"88 are "contrary to
8o. Sullivan, supra note 79, at 58.
81. Ruth Gavison, Comment, Legal Theory and the Role of Rules, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 727, 750 (1991).
82. 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) (emphasis added).
83. As one appeals court defined "clear error," the trial court decision "must strike us
as more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must ... strike us as wrong with
the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish." Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc.
v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988).
84. Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 727 F.2d 257, 261 (2d Cir. 1984) (emphasis add-
ed).
85. Brown v. Dade Christian Sch., Inc., 556 F.2d 310, 312 n.4 (5th Cir. 1977) (emphasis
added).
86. Campbell v. Barsky, 265 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1959).




the clear weight of the evidence,""s or go against "the truth and right of the
case, " 90 trial courts have committed clear error.
When examining for clear error, however, a "presumption of correctness"
attaches to the trial court's factual findings.9' An appellate court is not to "sub-
stitute [its] own impressions for those of the district court."9 2 It should not
overturn the trial court decision simply "because [it] 'would have decided the
case differently,' 93 nor should it "retry the facts." 94 Whether factual findings
were based on oral or other evidence, 9 appellate courts are not to make "inde-
pendent findings upon [the] evidence." 96 Even "where there are two permissible
views of the evidence, the fact finder's choice between them cannot be clearly
erroneous." 97 Relevant to mens rea determinations in actual malice and inten-
tional discrimination cases, Rule 52(a) itself states that the "reviewing court
must give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the witnesses' cre-
dibility." 98
The manner in which an appellate court articulates the clear error standard
is a good indication of what it will do with the trial court's ruling. When an ap-
pellate court evinces solicitude towards the fact finder's role by stating the rule
in the affirmative or by invoking the limits of appellate court's authority, it is
likely the judgment will be upheld. But if the appellate court opens its opinion
with a critique of the standard, it signals a likely reversal, modification, vaca-
tion, or remand of the trial court's judgment.99
89. In re Fielder, 799 F.2d 656, 657 (nth Cir. 1986) (quoting In re Panama-Williams
Corp., 235 F. Supp. 729, 732 (S.D. Tex. 1964)).
90. Moorehead v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int'l, Inc., 828 F.2d 278, 283 (sth Cir. 1987)
(quoting White v. Arco/Polymers, Inc., 720 F.2d 1391, 1395-96 (5th Cir. 1983)).
91. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485,500 (1984).
92. Adzick v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 351 F.3d 883, 889 (8th Cir. 2003).
93. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (quoting Anderson v. City of Besse-
mer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)).
94. Esenwein v. Pennsylvania ex rel. Esenwein, 325 U.S. 279, 281 (1945).
95. FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a)(6).
96. Panaview Door & Window Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 255 F.2d 920, 926 (9th Cir.
1958).
97. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574.
98. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6).
99. For example, consider the case Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v.
City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), in which the Sixth Circuit court re-
versed the district court's determination that an amendment to the city's charter
violated homosexuals' equal protection guarantees. In the paragraph immediately
after the factual exposition, the court noted: "Generally, [it] reviews findings of
fact for clear error and conclusions of law de novo .... However .. " Id. at 265.
That "however" immediately leads into a statement that the district court's "os-
tensible 'findings of fact"' were in reality "findings of 'ultimate' facts which entail
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More substantively, the myriad ways in which appellate courts define clear
error are not inconsequential. Having a "definite and firm conviction" that a
mistake has been made may not necessarily be the same as finding, for example,
that "reasonable men could not possibly make" factual findings. The latter lay-
ers an objective legal standard onto clear error, while Gypsum's "definite and
firm" language invites an intuitive assessment of the evidence upon which the
factual findings are premised.
The existence of any procedural rule creates a presumption that it should
be followed. In civil cases tried without a jury, the presumption holds that Rule
52(a) must be followed. The standard articulated in Rule 52(a), namely clear er-
ror, however, does not demand such fealty. A standard such as clear error
"tends to collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of the back-
ground principle or policy to a fact situation."'' ° If compelling reasons dictate a
deviation from the clear error standard of review, appellate judges, with consid-
eration towards the standard's underlying principles, may take one of three
roads: ignore it, resort to another rule, or create a new rule. 1 The clear error
standard of review can be (and has been) disregarded under various circum-
stances: i) The record below is based entirely upon documentary or other evi-
dence (ignoring the plain language of the rule);1 1 2 2) The trial court got the law
wrong (resorting to another rule);103 or 3) The trial court's factual determina-
tions fall within a category, such as a "constitutional," "ultimate," "legislative,"
or "sociological" fact, thus taking the factual determinations entirely out of the
clear error realm and into de novo-independent judgment territory.0 4
the application of law, or constitute sociological judgments which transcend ordi-
nary factual determinations ... ." Id. As such, they were subject to plenary review.
Id. Contrast this result with the Eighth Circuit's affirmation of a district court's
decision denying the appellant relief under an Equal Pay Act violation claim: "Our
duty in reviewing these determinations is to uphold them unless they are 'clearly
erroneous.' This standard of review does not permit us to substitute our own im-
pressions for those of the district court." Horner v. Mary Inst., 613 F.2d 7o6, 713
(8th Cir. 198o) (citation omitted).
loo. Sullivan, supra note 79, at 58.
lol. Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 645, 674-
77 (19i); Gavison, supra note 81, at 740-41.
102. See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); see also Alexander Proudfoot Co.
World Headquarters v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912, 916 (ilth Cir. 1989) ("The appellate
court, in reviewing the documentary evidence presented, is in as good a position
as the district court to determine the existence of personal jurisdiction. Our re-
view, therefore, is plenary." (citation omitted)).
103. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
1o4. See discussion supra Section I.A.
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B. De Novo Review
Juxtaposed against Rule 52(a)'s clear error standard is de novo review. In
comparison with clear error review, de novo compels a more rigorous review of
the trial court's determinations. De novo review is also called "independent," ' 5
"plenary, ' or "fu "1°7 review. Applicable to bench trials and to certain dispo-
sitive rulings and jury verdicts, ' de novo review is sweeping but not the most
searching scrutiny appellate courts can perform. ° 9
De novo review does not require that the appellate court give the trial court
determinations any formal deference and allows the appellate court to reach an
independent determination on the record.' ° Importantly, de novo review does
not demand a different conclusion on the record; it infers that appellate courts
are vested with the power and competence to reach a different conclusion.' 1'
Thus, de novo review does not automatically compel a different outcome.
This conclusion is apparent upon a closer look at what it means to conduct
de novo review. As described earlier, in reaching judgments, a trial court applies
factual findings to the relevant legal principles. On appeal, de novo review refers
to engagement on four levels of scrutiny. Certainly, appellate courts will exam-
ine whether the trial court applied settled law to the facts."2 If the appellate
court is satisfied with the trial court's application of the law application, discre-
tion-even under the de novo standard-would allow it to affirm the trial
court's conclusion. If, however, the trial court's decision raises the specter that
the trial court misinterpreted (and by extension, misapplied) the law,"'3 created
new law,"4 or failed to explain fairly the legal basis for its conclusions," 5 an ap-
105. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994); Salve Regina Coll. v.
Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991).
1O6. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115 (1985).
107. Edmundson v. Turner, 954 F.2d 510, 513-14 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
1101 (1992).
io8. For example, summary judgment motions, motions to dismiss, dispositive deci-
sions on injunctions, and jurisdictional rulings are reviewed de novo. See, e.g., Eu-
gene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment
Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431, 2443-44 (1998).
lo9. See infra Section II.C.
1io. Casey et al., supra note 4, at 290 n.35.
ill. Id. at 291.
112. McFarlin v. Conseco Servs., 381 F.3d 1251, 1259 (ith Cir. 2004).
113. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 n.15 (1982).
114. See, e.g., Magan v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 339 F.3d 158,163 (2d Cir. 2003).
115. See, e.g., Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelson, 128 S. Ct. 1140, 1144 (2008)
("[T] he Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the District Court applied a per
se rule. Given the circumstances of this case and the unclear basis of the District
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pellate court will engage in its most thorough reexamination of the record. Even
under those circumstances, although it becomes more likely that an appellate
court will reach a different conclusion, it is not required to do so.
In summary, how the trial judge treated the law is the first consideration on
appeal, which may then compel a reexamination of the facts adduced."6 That
reexamination may result in an appellate court reversing, modifying, vacating,
or remanding the trial court judgment. Certainly, the reviewing court could just
as well affirm the trial court's decision after de novo review."7 Nonetheless, such
expansive review allows appellate courts to examine the bases of factual find-
ings. Allowing that findings on intentional race discrimination are constitu-
tional facts, this ability is crucial.
C. Independent Appellate Judgment as a Matter of Constitutional Obligation
Independent appellate judgment entails something more than de novo re-
view. The Supreme Court, upon a determination that certain factual findings
implicate constitutional rights or obligations, speaks of a corresponding obliga-
tion to "make an independent examination of the whole record" in order to
make sure that "the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion" upon
a constitutional right."' If de novo review suggests that appellate courts enjoy
the power to examine closely the bases of the lower court's conclusions, they
have no option under the independent appellate judgment standard but to ex-
ercise that power when presented with constitutional facts.
The distinction between independent judgment and de novo review may
seem minimal, and though the distinction may be fine, the two terms are quali-
tatively different. To exercise one standard of review rather than another trig-
gers different, outcome-determinative cognitive frameworks. When an appel-
late court exercises de novo review, the trial court's factual findings and
reasoning behind those findings are treated with heightened skepticism. If only
informally, however, those findings and processes are given some degree of re-
gard. On the other hand, to make an independent appellate judgment connotes
a wholesale reassessment of the trial court's factual and legal conclusions. The
implication of that standard potentially provides support for taking issues away
from the jury or trial judge and, at all levels of litigation, treating those issues as
Court's decision, the Court of Appeals should have remanded the case to the Dis-
trict Court for clarification.").
116. Casey et al., supra note 4, at 292.
117. See, e.g., United States v. Abdulle, 564 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming,
through de novo review, challenges to sufficiency of evidence at trial); Marshall v.
Taylor, 395 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying de novo review and upholding the
trial court's denial of petitioner's habeas corpus application).
118. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (quoting
New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964)).
28 :1 2009
CRITICAL ERROR
ones to be decided as matters of law." 9 Under this standard, which was an-
nounced in Bose v. Consumers Union,12 ° when the appellate court is under a du-
ty to elaborate upon constitutional principles, it must examine fully the record
to protect those principles without reference to the trial court's findings or rea-
soning. Independent appellate judgment is thus a matter of constitutional obli-
gation.'2'
Independent review of constitutionally significant facts first appeared forty-
five years ago in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,' a case in which the Supreme
Court weighed actual malice liability against First Amendment principles. Yet,
as the late professor and federal judge Robert E. Keeton documents, the notion
of independent review as a concept, and the terminology associated with it, al-
ready had evolved in a variety of settings before the Sullivan decision fully and
formally introduced it into the Supreme Court's jurisprudence.' 3
In Schneiderman v. United States,'2 4 a 1943 denaturalization proceeding rais-
ing First Amendment issues, the Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's
clear error review of the trial court's ruling.' 5 By embarking upon a "broad
view" of the testimony, evidence, and trial court findings, the Court held that
the government had failed to meet its burden of proof to demonstrate that the
petitioner had procured his citizenship fraudulently. '26 Early opinions such as
Schneiderman spoke of "closer scrutiny" of facts found rather than "'independ-
ent' review.' 2 7 In cases after Sullivan, independent appellate review emerged as
"independent determination" and then "independent judgment."
Independent determination on constitutionally significant findings of his-
torical fact has been invoked under constitutional provisions other than the
First Amendment. The Supreme Court has applied the standard when deciding
119. KEETON, supra note 12, § 19.7.4.
120. Bose, 466 U.S. at 499.
121. Id. at 510-11 ("The requirement of independent appellate review.., emerged from
the exigency of deciding concrete cases; it is law in its purest form under our
common-law heritage. It reflects a deeply held conviction that judges-and par-
ticularly Members of this Court-must exercise such review in order to preserve
the precious liberties established and ordained by the Constitution.").
122. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
123. KEETON, supra note 12, § 19.7.3, at 550.
124. 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
125. Id. at 125.
126. Id. at 130.
127. KEETON, supra note 12, § 19.7.3, at 550; see also Baumgartner v. United States, 322
U.S. 665 (1944). The Court revoked a naturalization certificate based on allega-
tions of fraud and found that, because the case implicated the "nature of our Gov-
ernment and the duties and immunities of citizenship," the evidence below
should not be "deemed a 'fact' of the same order as all other 'facts,' not open to
review here." Id. at 671.
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controversies involving the Fourth Amendment, ' the Fifth Amendment,2 9 the
Seventh Amendment, 13 and the Tenth Amendment. 3' A few examples follow.
Miller v. Fenton, decided on the heels of Bose, raised Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment challenges in a habeas proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).' 32
The Supreme Court held in Miller that, although the question of whether a con-
fession was voluntary or not constituted an issue of fact and was entitled to a
presumption of correctness, "the ultimate question of the admissibility of a
confession merits treatment as a legal inquiry requiring plenary federal re-
view." 33
In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, the Court affirmed the Arkansas Su-
preme Court's ruling that its state constitutional amendment, which effectively
barred persons who had served a defined number of terms in the state legisla-
ture from running for federal congressional office, violated the U.S. Constitu-
tion.34 The Supreme Court agreed that the amendment violated Article I, Sec-
tion Five's Qualifications Clause 35 and that the Tenth Amendment did not
repose in the states the ability to alter or add to those qualifications. 36 From its
interpretation of the Qualifications Clause and the Tenth Amendment, the
Court noted the "constitutional significance" of the question, i.e., "whether the
fact that [the Amendment] is formulated as a ballot access restriction rather
than as an outright disqualification."' 37 On summary judgment, the Court re-
fused to cede that question to a trial on the merits, finding that the Tenth
Amendment had an "avowed purpose and obvious effect of evading the Quali-
fication Clauses."'
38
A third case bearing on the meaning and applicability of independent re-
view of historical-constitutional facts was Thompson v. Keohane.139 Like Miller,
Thompson was a habeas petition calling for an interpretation of § 2254(d)'s pre-
128. E.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996).
129. E.g., United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
13o. E.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
131. E.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
132. 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
133. Id. at 115.
134. 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995).
135. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. i ("Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceed-
ings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of
two-thirds, expel a Member.").
136. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 837.
137. Id. at 787.
138. Id. at 831.
139. 516 U.S. 99 (1995).
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sumption of correctness. 4° Thompson had argued that his alleged confession
occurred without the proper Miranda warnings; the critical factual issue was
whether Thompson was "in custody" for purposes of deciding if or when his
constitutional right would arise. 14' Justice Ginsburg writing for the majority,
stated that "in custody" determinations for Fifth Amendment purposes are not
"entitled to a presumption of correctness.' ' 142 After reviewing § 2254 cases in
which the Court categorized certain issues as fact and others as law, she wrote
that "[c]lassifying 'in custody' as a determination qualifying for independent
review" was appropriate so as to "unify precedent" and "stabilize the law."' 43 As
will be shown, that same rationale provided the basis for the Court in Bose to
embark upon an independent evaluation of the trial court's actual malice find-
ings.
Eight years ago, the Supreme Court seemed poised to apply Rule 52(a)'s
constitutional fact exception to an intentional race discrimination case. Re-
evaluating the evidence, it reversed a direct appeal from the district court find-
ing that the North Carolina Legislature had violated the Equal Protection
Clause. In Easley v. Cromartie, the substantive issue was the extent to which vot-
ing patterns of African-Americans could be used to draw district boundaries.' 44
The district court had found that the state legislature had improperly used race,
not politics, as a predominant consideration when it redesigned the Twelfth
Congressional District. 145 In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Breyer, the Court
determined that the question of whether the North Carolina Legislature was
motivated by race in redrawing the Twelfth Congressional District lines was
"constitutionally critical."'' 6 The majority described the issue as such even as it
acknowledged clear error was the proper standard of review, noting that the
"ultimate finding"147 of race as a predominant motivating factor was an eviden-
tiary one.' 48 While that standard would entail a high degree of deference to the
trial court determination, as well as to legislative decision making, the majority
140. Id. at 102.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 107.
143. Id. at 115 ("Classifying 'in custody' as a determination qualifying for independent
review should serve legitimate law enforcement interests as effectively as it serves
to ensure protection of the right against self-incrimination. As our decisions bear
out, the law declaration aspect of independent review potentially may guide po-
lice, unify precedent, and stabilize the law.").
144. 532 U.S. 234, 240-41(2001).
145. Id. at 240.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 241.
148. Id.
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decided to operate under a more searching standard, an "extensive review. . . for
clear error."'149
That unprecedented twist on clear error seemed to push the question of
race and intent into constitutional fact-independent judgment territory. The
majority highlighted the "unique" circumstances and posture of the litigation,
however, reducing the likelihood that constitutional fact and independent
judgment concepts would come to embrace fully intentional discrimination in-
quiries. First, much of the evidence in the case was based on documents and ex-
pert testimony.'50 Second, the case was on direct appeal from the district court.
Third, the Supreme Court itself had passed on Easley three other times in the
preceding decade.15' Finally, and crucially, the majority made virtually no effort
to "legitimize" its rationale by, for example, grounding it in precedent or articu-
lating it as a new legal norm. The Court could have ruled that because of the
constitutional implications for the factual conclusion that race was a predomi-
nant factor in redrawing the Twelfth Congressional District, findings regarding
the existence or absence of intentional race discrimination require it to make an
independent judgment of the trial court's conclusion. Failing to do so ulti-
mately gave the Easley decision less precedential value than it otherwise could
have carried for standard of review and intentional race discrimination doc-
trineEach standard of review determines the degree of deference an appellate
court is to give the trial judge's findings. The standard of review applied is con-
tingent upon the issues being reviewed or the character of the factual findings.
Understanding the distinctions between clear error, de novo, and independent
judgment, the range of standards of review on appeal might look something like
this:'52
149. Id. at 243 (emphasis added).
150. Id. at 242-43. This reasoning was given despite Rule 52(a)'s explicit mandate.
151. Easley began in 1992 as Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C. 1992) and was re-
viewed as Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) [hereinafter Shaw I]; Shaw v. Hunt,
517 U.S. 899 (1996) [hereinafter Shaw II]; and Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541
(1999).
152. Cf. Casey et al., supra note 4, at 287. For a discussion of these and other standards
of review, see Orvis v. Higgins, 18o F.2d 537, 539-40 (2d Cir. 1950).
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Standard Independent De Novo/ Clear Error Substantial Abuse of
of Review Appellate Independent/ Evidence Discretion
Judgment Plenary
Trigger Constitutional Ultimate, Historical/ Jury Evidentiary
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In deciding to deviate from the clear error standard, appellate judges must
first weigh important considerations. Competence, administrative efficiencies,
and doctrinal coherence are the core values Rule 52(a) embodies. Consequently,
appellate judges must balance the institutional and jurisprudential values at
stake when they decide whether the clear error standard should be followed.
III. RULE 52(A) AND INSTITUTIONAL VALUES
In light of the fact that intentional race discrimination and actual malice
findings are treated differently under the clear error standard of review and the
constitutional fact doctrine, it is useful to examine the institutional values that
lie beneath the standard and the doctrine. Doing so allows us to explore wheth-
er there may be a deeper rationale for treating the legal concepts differently.
As a general proposition, procedural rules express institutional goals. If
properly crafted and applied, they act transsubstantively to further jurispruden-
tial and institutional values.' 3 In one sense, Rule 52(a) is an action-guiding
norm that channels the subjects (e.g., litigants and witnesses) and objects (rele-
153. Matheson, supra note 12, at 229.
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vant legal and factual elements) through the appellate process . 4 Most impor-
tant, Rule 52(a) allocates duties and confers powers between trial and appellate
judges. It performs those functions by allocating responsibilities for fact identi-
fication, law declaration, and law application. 55 Directing that findings of fact
"shall not be set aside unless" demonstrates that Rule 52(a) aimed to fix the
realm of authority trial courts would possess, namely province over fact identi-
fication." 6 That the drafters did not have Rule 52(a) state that factual findings
"shall be set aside if' reflects that they did not intend Rule 52(a) to articulate the
reach of the appellate courts over the trial courts. By negation, however, Rule
52(a) reinforces the principle that appellate courts ultimately retain the respon-
sibility and authority to declare law or articulate and develop legal norms.
Several institutional values militate in favor of Rule 52(a)'s edict that places
factual determinations with the trial court and legal determinations with the
appellate courts. Judge Richard Posner observed that procedural rules serve two
primary functions: to reduce both error costs and direct costs. 7 Error costs, or
social costs, are those incurred in the absence of accurate or "fair" outcomes.
S8
For example, appellate review serves in part to reduce the likelihood of incor-
rect results that might arise from the trial court's misinterpretation or misappli-
cation of law. Direct costs are those economic or temporal losses incurred by
the litigants and judicial system. Judge Posner's economic framework incorpo-
rates institutional values of tribunal competency, administrative efficiency, and
the need for doctrinal coherence. But, as will be shown, those laudable institu-
tional values embodied in Rule 52(a) and the constitutional fact doctrine apply
equally to intentional race discrimination and actual malice determinations.
154. See Gavison, supra note 81, at 740-41.
155. Facts are identified through collection and distillation within the adjudicative
framework. Adamson, Ideological Weapon, supra note 24, at 1043. Law application
is a judgment that a particular law "is relevant to... facts [identified), or stated
conversely, that the facts, by meeting the standard instantiated in the law, trigger
legal consequences." Alogna, supra note 46, at 1155 ("Application of law to facts
entails a judgment that that [a] law is relevant to [certain] facts, or stated con-
versely, that the facts, by meeting the standard instantiated in the law, trigger legal
consequences."). Law declaration, on the other hand, is the creation or develop-
ment of legal norms. Adamson, Ideological Weapon, supra note 24, at 1043.
156. FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a) (emphasis added).
157. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Admini-
stration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 448 (1973) (articulating a goal of legal procedure as
"minimizing the sum of error costs and of the direct costs"); see also Warren F.
Schwartz & Gordon Tullock, The Costs of a Legal System, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 75, 79
(1975) (discussing policy proposals for minimizing the efficiency costs of legal sys-
tems).
158. See Posner, supra note 157, at 400.
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A. Respective Tribunal Competencies
Rule 52(a) is a deep bow to the competence of trial courts in finding facts,
no matter the type or form. To be sure, this rationale serves as the primary jus-
tification for the deference ceded to trial judges on intentional race discrimina-
tion findings. Trial courts are best suited to take evidence, empanel juries, and
(of particular relevance to actual malice and intentional discrimination find-
ings) evaluate witness credibility, demeanor, context, and atmosphere. In other
words, trial judges have a better familiarity with both common and unique as-
pects of a given case.'5 9 Although one can argue legitimately that trial judges en-
joy no special advantage when facts based on, for example, documentary evi-
dence constitute the entire record, heightened competence has served as one
justification for reposing fact-finding responsibilities with trial courts.6
Conversely, Rule 52(a) acknowledges the expertise of appellate courts in
applying or declaring law and developing norms. The role of appellate judges is
to consider and apply thoughtfully the law with a high degree of intellectual ri-
gor. By extension, appellate judges are better able to ensure decisional accuracy
as it relates to law application and declaration. The presumption of finality to
factual findings gives appellate judges that deliberative space by limiting the
scope and quantity of appeals. Thus, as factual findings begin to look more like
law declaration or norm elaboration-as constitutional facts do-the clear er-
ror standard yields to de novo review, or the exercise of independent judgment.
B. Administrative Efficiencies
By directing trial court authority over oral or other forms of evidence and
urging "due regard" for witness credibility determinations,6 Rule 52(a) also re-
duces direct costs. Put another way, since trial courts are better positioned to
make such determinations, appellate costs will not be "sunk" into relitigating
credibility determinations capably found earlier. Direct costs are lowered also
because litigants, aware of the presumptive finality of factual findings, are com-
pelled to prosecute their cases more vigorously. If litigants operated under the
assumption that they could get a second bite at the apple and relitigate facts on
appeal, they might not pursue their claims diligently and thus would increase
direct costs to the system, if not to themselves. The presumption of finality to
factual findings reduces direct costs to the appellate system, reduces appellate
judge workload, and furthers appellate judges' ability to reduce error costs
159. Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review-Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 MARQ. L.
REV. 231, 239-41 (1991); Wright, supra note 24, at 781-82.
16o. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 702 (1996) ("Decision of the issue pre-
sented in these cases must be based ultimately on the application of the fact-
finding tribunal's experience with the mainsprings of human conduct .... ") (Sca-
lia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
161. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6).
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through decisional accuracy. Decisional accuracy imperatives supplant adminis-
trative efficiencies when constitutional facts are at issue. The need to give delib-
erate consideration to law application and norm development outweighs direct
cost reduction.
C. Doctrinal Coherence
Rule 52(a) does no violence to appellate courts' power and authority to
maintain control of and clarify legal principles. This third institutional value
underlying Rule 52(a) seeks to ensure that legal norms are articulated, applied,
and developed properly."'2 To expand appellate review to encompass factual
finding redeterminations would generate decisions of marginal weight or pre-
cedential value due to the number and fact-specific nature of opinions. 6 By li-
miting the scope of review of factual findings, the judicial system avoids the
doctrinal dissonance that otherwise would arise should different circuit panels
interpret the same legal norms differently.'6 4
Doctrinal coherence becomes most essential when federal-especially con-
stitutional-rights are at issue. Indeed, a critical aspect of the Supreme Court's
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins"6 ' decision touches upon appellate court powers
under Rule 52(a). The separation of powers aspect of the Erie doctrine echoes
the Rules Enabling Act provision that enjoins federal judges from creating or
applying rules that "abridge, enlarge, or modify" a substantive right.'66 Erie en-
joined the articulation of judge-made common law in the absence of a federal
constitutional or statutory provision,' and the case therefore has stood for the
proposition that appellate judges should not allow, under any circumstance, a
federal rule to override a substantive right. 6 Similarly, the constitutional fact
doctrine embodies substantive rights. The doctrine stands as an exception to
Rule 52(a)'s clear error standard to ensure that procedural rules do not abridge
substantive rights and to allow appellate courts to establish a consistent set of
162. Cf. Allen & Pardo, supra note 12 at 1776; Alogna, supra note 46, at 1154; Richard D.
Friedman, Standards of Persuasion and the Distinction Between Fact and Law, 86
Nw. U. L. REV. 916, 918 (1992).
163. Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Authority Between the Trial and
Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question,
and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 1014 (1986).
164. Consider that, for example, a nine-member court can yield eighty-four different
three-member panel combinations.
165. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
166. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
167. Robert P. Wasson, Jr., Resolving Separation of Powers and Federalism Problems
Raised by Erie, the Rules of Decision Act, and the Rules Enabling Act: A Proposed So-
lution, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 519, 527 (2004).
168. Id. at 528.
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principles that animate the constitutional right or obligation. If doctrinal coher-
ence is imperative for some constitutional facts, however, it would seem that,
despite the costs of intracircuit dissonance or appellate caseload, norm coher-
ence should be imperative for all constitutional facts.
As facts move from the category of the "pure" historical fact type to those
that would concretize legal norms or rules, appellate authority to reexamine
lower courts' decisions is triggered. Rule 52(a) attempts to strike the proper bal-
ance in furthering the values respecting tribunal competencies, administrative
efficiencies, and doctrinal coherence. Yet, these institutional values underlying
Rule 52(a) and the constitutional fact exception do not fully explain why inten-
tional race discrimination factual determinations are treated differently than
actual malice determinations.
IV. ACTIVE VIRTUES, PASSIVE VIRTUES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS
Given that institutional values inherent in Rule 52(a) and the constitutional
fact exception cannot explain fully this differential treatment, it is now appro-
priate to examine the respective jurisprudence of actual malice and intentional
discrimination. What follows is an account of how the Supreme Court has ap-
plied the constitutional fact exception to actual malice jurisprudence yet has
remained steadfast in its refusal to apply that exception to intentional race dis-
crimination doctrine.
In 1982, the Supreme Court emphasized a type of judicial minimalism re-
garding intentional race discrimination factual findings. In Pullman-Standard v.
Swint,69 a case alleging intentional race discrimination in Pullman-Standard's
seniority system, the standard of review choice was squarely at issue. The Court
was unequivocal:
[Rule 52(a)] does not make exceptions or purport to exclude cer-
tain categories of factual findings from the obligation of a court of ap-
peals to accept a district court's findings unless clearly erroneous. It
does not divide facts into categories; in particular, it does not divide
findings of fact into those that deal with 'ultimate' and those that deal
with 'subsidiary' facts. 7 °
Despite that pronouncement, the Supreme Court urged two years later an
active approach to Rule 52(a) as it regards actual malice findings; the constitu-
tional fact exception must be applied, and independent appellate judgment
must be made on such findings. Thus, the Supreme Court has concluded that to
fulfill the institutional value of doctrinal coherence, appellate courts must ig-
nore Rule 52(a)'s plain language when it comes to constitutional facts-but on-
ly some of the time.
169. 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
170. Id. at 287-88.
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A. Actively Privileging Actual Malice
The constitutional fact doctrine emerged out of the jurisdictional fact con-
troversies arising in appeals from administrative agency decisions on due proc-
ess and takings issues.17' The doctrine gained force when it first appeared in a
criminal case, Near v. Minnesota.17 New York Times v. Sullivan'7 was the first
case that placed actual malice into the constitutional fact setting, as the Su-
preme Court announced its obligation to make an independent determination
on the factual record. A series of additional cases further refined malice as a
constitutional fact. 174 It was with Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union of U.S.,
Inc.'75 that the Court applied this exception and announced a new standard of
appellate review on actual malice findings. 176
Bose was a product disparagement claim brought by the manufacturer
against the publisher of Consumer Reports and the authors of a review of the lat-
est Bose loudspeaker. The primary author of the loudspeaker test report wrote
that the loudspeaker caused the sounds of individual musical instruments to
wander "about the room," language which found its way into the published ar-
ticle.'77 The trial judge ruled that the author made a false and disparaging state-
ment and did so with actual malice. 7 The court of appeals, reviewing the dis-
trict court decision on liability de novo, reversed. 79 While affirming the court of
171. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276
(1922); Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920). For a
more extensive discussion of the constitutional fact doctrine, see, for example,
Hoffman, supra note 8; Monaghan, supra note 70; Rachael N. Pine, Speculation
and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U.
PA. L. REV. 655 (1988); Judah A. Shechter, Note, De Novo Judicial Review of Ad-
ministrative Agency Factual Determinations Implicating Constitutional Rights, 88
COLO. L. REV. 1483 (1988).
172. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
173. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (stating that plaintiffs must prove actual malice against media
defendants in a libel action).
174. E.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (actual malice and non-
public figures); Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971) (fair report-
ing and actual malice); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971) (actual
malice, public figures, and the meaning of "official conduct"); Greenbelt Coop.
Publ'g Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (jury instruction on actual malice); Time,
Inc., v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (newsworthiness defense); Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64 (1964) (actual malice and criminal libel).
175. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
176. Id. at 5oi n.17, 514.
177. Id. at 488.
178. Id. at 489-91.
179. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 692 F.2d 189, 195 (1st Cir. 1982).
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appeals decision, the Supreme Court invoked its constitutional responsibility of
independent review "to test challenged judgments against the guarantees of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.'
'8 °
The Supreme Court went on to discuss why Rule 52(a) did not apply to ac-
tual malice. The crux of the Court's justification for independent judgment can
be found in Footnote Seventeen. It is entirely textually based, with no citations
to other cases whatsoever. There, the majority noted how the term "actual mal-
ice" blurs the line between fact and law:
A finding of fact in some cases is inseparable from the principles
through which it was deduced. At some point, the reasoning by which
a fact is 'found' crosses the line between application of those ordinary
principles of logic and common experience which are ordinarily en-
trusted to the finder of fact into the realm of a legal rule upon which
the reviewing court must exercise its own independent judgment.... Re-
garding certain largely factual questions in some areas of the law, the
stakes-in terms of impact on future cases and future conduct-are
too great to entrust them finally to the judgment of the trier of fact.'
In the text surrounding that footnote, Justice Stevens also makes the point that,
though Rule 52(a) prescribes deferential review even for "ultimate" findings of
fact, i.e., those that directly impel a legal consequence, Rule 52(a) does "not in-
hibit an appellate court's power to correct errors of law, including those that
may infect a so-called mixed finding of law and fact, or a finding of fact that is
predicted on a misunderstanding of the governing rule of law." '' 82 Thus, at a
minimum, the majority acknowledged actual malice determinations as mixed
questions of law and fact.
Given the majority's rationale in part, it could have taken a minimalist ap-
proach to its review. The majority reasoned that "Rule 52(a) never forbids" a
more expansive review of the trial proceedings.' 8 3 The majority asserted that the
Gypsum Court "expressly contemplated a review of the entire record" when it
emphasized that a "finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evi-
dence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the de-
finite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."'8 4 Instead, the
Court articulated reasoning that went far beyond the confines of Gypsum's clear
error definition.
The Court identified three characteristics of the Sullivan actual malice rule
relevant to the decision to apply independent judgment instead of clear error.
First, due to the common law evolution of the standard, trial judges were ac-
180. 466 U.S. at 508 n.27 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 190 (1964)).
181. Id. at 5oi n.17 (emphasis added).
182. Id. at 501.
183. Id. at 499. But see discussion supra Section II.A.
184. Id. at 499 (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)) (em-
phasis added).
corded "an especially broad role ... in applying it to specific factual situa-
tions." s5 Second, the meaning of "actual malice" had evolved only through
case-by-case adjudication-making it largely a judge-made rule of law)86 Third,
"the constitutional values protected by the rule [made] it imperative that
judges-and in some cases judges of this Court-make sure that it is correctly
applied."'8s Based upon that reasoning, the Bose majority felt no need whatso-
ever to be "bound by the conclusions of lower courts, but [could] re-examine
the evidentiary basis" for the appellate court's conclusions on actual malice.
88
The announced constitutional obligation outweighed any policies or prin-
ciples underlying Rule 52(a) that otherwise might justify fidelity to the clear er-
ror standard. Even so, the majority acknowledged that the core determination
of actual malice, namely actual knowledge of falsity or subjective, reckless disre-
gard for falsity, involved nothing more than findings on the mens rea of the au-
thor.8 9 The court reexamined the appellate court's and district court's findings,
including those regarding the subjective state of mind of the review's author
and sound expert.' 90 Thus, beginning with an unprecedented Rule 52(a) inter-
pretation, and ending with its three-pronged Sullivan-based rationale, the ma-
jority ruled that independent appellate judgment on actual malice determina-
tions is not only appropriate but also imperative.
B. Passively Marginalizing Intentional Race Discrimination
In contrast, the Supreme Court has taken a far more modest approach with
intentional race discrimination findings, insisting that this particular type of
fact finding mandates neither independent appellate judgment nor independent
review. In deeming that Rule 52(a)'s clear error standard must guide appellate
inquiry into such findings, the Court has frequently invoked the tribunal com-
petency value reflected by the rule 9
Rule 52(a) directs appellate courts to give "due regard" to the trial judge's
assessment of the "witnesses' credibility."' 92 Since intentional race discrimina-
tion is a state of mind determination, often turning upon witness demeanor, the
185. Id. at 503.
186. Id. ("When the standard governing the decision of a particular case is provided by
the Constitution, this Court's role in marking out the limits of the standard
through the process of case-by-case adjudication is of special importance.").
187. Id. at 502.
188. Id. at 509-10.
189, Id. at 498 ("It surely does not stretch the language of the Rule to characterize an
inquiry into what a person knew at a given point in time as a question of 'fact."').
19o. Id. at 493-98.
191. See, e.g., Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 343 (2oo6) (Breyer, J., concurring); Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982).
192. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6).
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Court has insisted that the trial judge is best situated to make the most credible
conclusions on intent. 93 This rationale, however, is especially unpersuasive giv-
en that the bases of intentional race discrimination evidentiary findings and ac-
tual malice findings are essentially the same.
Like actual malice, intentional race discrimination calls for an inquiry into
an actor's motivation or mental state to determine animus or illicit motive. Di-
rect, circumstantial, oral, or other evidence can serve as evidence of intentional
discrimination. Regardless of the form of the discrimination ("subtle or overt,
conscious or unconscious"), 94 the fact finder is charged with ferreting out the
discriminatory purpose.
It is necessary to discuss briefly the evolution of the intent standard under
the Equal Protection Clause in order to address fully the substantive injustice
done by the Court's failure to extend the constitutional fact exception to inten-
tional race discrimination determinations. That clause provides that no state
shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."' 95 Ratified in light of the ineffectiveness of the Thirteenth Amendment,
which sought to eliminate all badges and incidents of slavery,19' 6 the Fourteenth
Amendment transformed the bulk of Congress's 1866 Civil Rights and Freed-
man Bureau Acts into constitutional mandates1 97 The Equal Protection Clause,
which is the primary constitutional remedy for racial discrimination, makes no
distinction between cause or effect, intent, or even negligence.
193. As Justice Breyer noted in his concurring opinion in Rice (a case of race discrimi-
nation in jury selection) an appellate court is not as ideally situated to make cre-
dibility determinations as the trial court because, on a cold record, it cannot de-
tect "a prosecutor's hesitation or contradiction reflect (a) deception, or (b) the
difficulty of providing a rational reason for an instinctive decision.... These cir-
cumstances mean that appellate courts will, and must, grant the trial courts con-
siderable leeway in applying Batson." 546 U.S. at 343.
194. Selmi, supra note 30, at 283.
195. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, cl. 1.
196. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Sta-
tus-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1121 (1997) ("Because there was
dispute about whether the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of slavery vested
Congress with the power to define and protect civil rights in this fashion, Con-
gress began work on the drafting and ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.").
197. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (2006)) ("[C]itizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previ-
ous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude ... shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceed-
ings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.").
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If a law, policy, or regulation explicitly classifies citizens on the basis of
race, the Supreme Court precedent has required a strict scrutiny analysis.' g8
Once the existence of a suspect classification is established, courts presume dis-
criminatory intent and apply strict scrutiny.'99 For a time, that presumption and
analysis would apply also to facially neutral initiatives with racially dispropor-
tionate impacts.
The presumption based upon racially disproportionate impact disappeared
with Washington v. Davis."° Davis was a due process challenge brought by two
African-American applicants for the Washington, D.C. police department. They
charged that the department used racially discriminatory hiring procedures;
specifically, the applicants asserted that the department's personnel test demon-
strated a racially disproportionate impact. The petitioners put forth evidence
that African-Americans failed Test 21, a verbal skills examination, at a rate four
times higher than white applicants."'
The Court rejected the appellate court's application of its Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.2° 2 ruling that a demonstration of disparate impact was sufficient itself
to demonstrate a violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.2"3 Marking a
seismic shift in its jurisprudence regarding burdens of proof, the Supreme
Court concluded that when challenging facially neutral laws, policies, or regula-
tions, plaintiffs must prove discriminatory intent.0 4 In addition to heightened
pleading requirements in other public employment cases like Davis,"°5 plaintiffs
bear that heightened burden in public housing,"0 6 school desegregation,0 7 re-
districting,"' and voting rights equal protection contexts. 9
198. This standard first appeared in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
199. Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) ("A racial classification,
regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld
only upon an extraordinary justification.") (citations omitted).
200. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
201. Id. at 237.
202. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
203. Davis, 426 U.S. at 238.
204. Before Davis, lower courts had used the disproportionate racial impact theory to
overturn legislation that did not have a racial criterion of selection but did have a
disparate impact. See Samuel Issacharoff, Note, Making the Violation Fit the Rem-
edy: The Intent Standard and Equal Protection Law, 92 YALE L.J. 328 (1982).
205. E.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1993) (emphasizing that
the burden always rests with the plaintiff to prove intentional discrimination in a
disparate treatment case).
206. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
207. Keyes v. Sch. Dis. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 198 (1973).
208. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257 (2001).
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If Davis effectively heightened the burden of proving race-based discrimi-
nation as a matter of substance, Pullman-Standard effectively narrowed appel-
late redress of such claims as a matter of procedure. 1' In Pullman-Standard,
another Title VII case, African-American employees sued their employer, ral-
way freight manufacturer Pullman-Standard, and its employees' unions, alleg-
ing that its two seniority systems had the intent and effect of excluding African-
Americans from particular bargaining units and promotion opportunities. 1 In
reversing the district court's finding of no intentional racial discrimination by
the terms or operation of the seniority system, the court of appeals treated the
lower court's factual findings as "ultimate facts," thus warranting an "analysis of
the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the creation and con-
tinuance of the departmental system.2 12 The Supreme Court concluded that the
court of appeals erroneously failed to apply Rule 52(a):
[Diiscriminatory intent is a finding of fact to be made by the trial
court; it is not a question of law and not a mixed question of law and
fact of the kind that in some cases may allow an appellate court to re-
view the facts to see if they satisfy some legal concept of discriminatory
intent.1 3
Since Pullman-Standard,1 4 the Supreme Court has been steadfast in apply-
ing Rule 52(a)'s clear error standard to intentional discrimination factual find-
209. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (196o); see also Siegel, supra note 196, at 1130
(arguing that the Supreme Court embraced discriminatory purpose as the touch-
stone for unconstitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause for facially neu-
tral state action).
210. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
211. Id. at 275 n.1.
212. Id. at 287.
213. Id. at 289.
214. In his dissent, Justice Marshall did not quarrel with the character of intentional
race discrimination findings (e.g., that they were "ultimate" facts) but rather sup-
ported appeals court's conclusions on more traditional rationales. Id. at 295 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). He noted that the Fifth Circuit itself acknowledged that the
"clearly erroneous" standard controlled but that the Court's conclusion was justi-
fied because the district court's findings were based on "an erroneous view of con-
trolling legal principles." Id. at 300. It therefore was "irrelevant that the Court of
Appeals did not specifically hold that the District Court's other factual findings
were clearly erroneous." Id. n.5. Justice Marshall also conceded that the premise
underlying Rule 52(a) deference is the reality that findings of fact "depend pecu-
liarly upon the credit given to witnesses by those who see and hear them." Id. at
301 (citing United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 341 (1949)). Because the
district court's findings were based entirely on documentary evidence, however,
the "usual deference [was] not required." Id.
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ings.1 5 Furthermore, the clear error standard of review applies not only to the
ultimate finding on discrimination but also to the so-called subsidiary facts and
inferences from the facts."6 Even when the Supreme Court had full opportunity
to revisit the clear error rule for intentional race discrimination in light of Bose,
it remained resolute. In Hernandez v. New York, 17 the Court rejected the peti-
tioner's argument that the New York Court of Appeals should have reviewed
independently the prosecutor's stated reasons for exercising its allegedly racially
discriminatory peremptory challenges. Evincing an utter lack of appreciation
for any possible similarity between actual malice and intentional race discrimi-
nation determinations, the Court found Bose of"no relevance. "218
Despite the significance of the constitutional violation that follows a find-
ing of intentional discrimination, the Supreme Court has insisted that inten-
tional discrimination "does not lose its factual character because its resolution is
dispositive of the ultimate constitutional question. 219 Yet, somehow "the con-
stitutional values protected by the [actual malice] rule make it imperative that
judges-and in some cases judges of this Court-make sure that it is correctly
applied."2 ' Given that inconsistency, we can explore the doctrinal and institu-
tional soundness of the Court's reasoning to see whether its display of passive
virtues vis-a-vis intentional race discrimination determinations is warranted.
V. THE SUBTLE VICES OF PASSIVE VIRTUES
It now is useful to explore the inconsistent treatment of actual malice and
intentional race discrimination findings from three perspectives. First, this Part
tests the soundness of the Bose reasoning, looking at whether any fundamental
differences between actual malice and intentional race discrimination concepts
account for the differential treatment. Second, it asks which underlying institu-
tional values argue for treating the two concepts differently. From there, it fi-
nally articulates more fully how Rule 52(a) and the Supreme Court's selective
application of the constitutional fact exception work a substantive injustice on
215. See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 243 (2001) (affirming that race rather
than politics was a motivating factor in the state's redistricting plan, finding that
the decision was reviewable under the clear error standard, and ultimately apply-
ing a different standard); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 524 (1993)
(holding that the trier of fact's rejection of the employer's asserted nondiscrimina-
tory purpose is subject to review under a clear error standard); Lehnert v. Ferris
Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 532 (1991) (finding the issue of purposeful employ-
ment discrimination reviewable under the clear error standard).
216. 1 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW
§ 2.24, at 146-48 (3d ed. 1999).
217. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
218. Id. at 367.
219. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104,113 (1985).
220. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485,501-02 (1984).
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intentional race discrimination determinations. Before concluding, it sets forth
consequences that might arise from according intentional race discrimination
factual findings independent appellate judgment.
A. Actual Malice and Intentional Race Discrimination-A Doctrinal Cri-
tique
The Bose majority's parsing of Gypsum's definition of Rule 52(a) is wholly
disingenuous, as it seems the majority wanted to adhere to the rule while simul-
taneously departing from it. The Bose majority tortures the Gypsum language,
substituting "reviewing ... the entire evidence"2"' with a reweighting of the evi-
dence. As one scholar observed, Gypsum's "definite and firm conviction" lan-
guage did not signal intent "to extend the scope of factual review" but merely
did "no more than suggest a means of approach to the nebulous problem of
when a finding of fact is subject to reversal under Rule 52(a)." 2 In other words,
the Gypsum Court correctly assumed that appellate judges are doing their jobs
when it speaks of the "reviewing court" looking at the "entire evidence" in
reaching a "definite and firm conviction" of a trial court mistake.2 3 If the Bose
majority's interpretation of Gypsum is warranted, then the clear error standard
is utterly meaningless. The Bose majority's reinterpretation of Gypsum marks a
unique departure from the clear error standard.
Notably, while all nine justices in Bose agreed that an independent review
was warranted in the context of previous decisions presenting underlying con-
stitutional claims, two did not subscribe to the majority's independent judg-
ment language. 2 4 In its final footnote, the majority opinion seems to sense its
own overreaching. Justice Stevens assures us that the Court did not make an in-
dependent judgment in the sense of conducting "an original appraisal of all of
the evidence" but instead took "an independent assessment only of the evidence
germane to the actual-malice determination." 2 5 In offering what comes across
as a post hoc rationalization, he introduced confusion as to which elements of
libel itself would, as a constitutional imperative, demand "independent assess-
ment" going forward." 6
221. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S 364, 395 (1948).
222. Comment, Scope of Appellate Fact Review Widened, 2 STAN. L. REV. 784, 787 (1950)
(opining on the impact of Gypsum on Rule 52(a)).
223. Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 395.
224. Bose, 466 U.S. at 519 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 515 (White, J., dissent-
ing).
225. Id. at 514 n.3.
226. Id. Bose has been interpreted as requiring independent review regarding the "of
and concerning" prima facie libel element. David A. Elder, Truth, Accuracy and
Neutral Reportage: Beheading the Media Jabberwock's Attempts To Circumvent New
York Times v. Sullivan, 9 VAN. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 551, 584 (2007); Susan M. Gilles,
Taking First Amendment Procedure Seriously: An Analysis of Process in Libel Litiga-
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
It is possible that the Court went too far in Bose when announcing that ac-
tual malice determinations must be subjected to independent appellate judg-
ment. To be sure, its core holding both has been criticized and distinguished by
lower courts.227 In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist lays out a compelling case as to
why appellate courts were not as competent to assess the pivotal determination,
the author's credibility on the stand," 8 which we have seen is an issue that ap-
pears in intentional discrimination cases. Nonetheless, even Rehnquist con-
ceded that independent appellate review should follow when "a conclusion of
law as to a Federal right and a finding of fact are so intermingled as to make it
necessary, in order to pass upon the Federal question, to analyze the facts. '" 9
The fact that Bose has been followed by the Court in cases in which the issue of
independent appellate judgment on constitutional issues was squarely before
tion, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1753, 1772 (1998); Matheson, supra note 12, at 272. Independ-
ent review also may apply to findings of falsity, negligence, and the opinion-fact
distinction; may mandate review only of actual malice; may mandate de novo re-
view; may apply to appeals by both parties or only to defense appeals; and may
apply only to appeals from trial verdicts. Gilles, supra, at 1772-73; see also Tigran
W. Eldred, Note, Amplifying Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union: The Proper Scope of
De Novo Appellate Review in Public Defamation Cases, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 579
(1989) (discussing how the Bose decision left unanswered many questions regard-
ing the scope of de novo review in libel cases).
Some appellate courts have interpreted Bose as not requiring de novo review
of the subsidiary facts going to the presence or absence of actual malice. Harte-
Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 69o-91 (1989), may have
launched a retreat by suggesting that, even with independent review, the appellate
court must accept undisputed facts and those which the jury "must have" found
as a given. But, the Court repeated its independent review of "the factual record in
full" language, which would entail an examination of "the statements at issue and
the circumstances under which they were made." Id. at 688. By not clearly answer-
ing the question of which factual elements of actual malice would be subject to
independent review-the historical facts or the evaluative inferences made from
those facts-the Bose decision has given appellate courts permission to reweigh
fully the facts underlying a district court's finding on actual malice and other libel
elements.
227. See, e.g., Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226, 1230 (ioth Cir. 1995) (discuss-
ing Bose); Multimedia Publ'g Co. of S.C., Inc. v. Greenville-Spartanburg Airport
Dist., 991 F.2d 154, 16o (4th Cir. 1993) (distinguishing Multimedia Publishing from
Bose).
228. Bose, 466 U.S. at 520 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Because it is not clear to me that
the de novo findings of appellate courts, with only bare records before them, are
likely to be any more reliable than the findings reached by trial judges, I cannot
join the majority's sanctioning of factual second-guessing by appellate courts.").
229. Id. at 516 (quoting Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 38o, 385-86 (1927)).
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the Court is some testament to the staying power of that announced princi-
ple.3
So if the independent appellate judgment rule as to First Amendment (ac-
tual malice) factual findings is correct, what of other constitutionally significant
findings? The majority's rationale for independent judgment in Bose-the
common law evolution of the actual malice standard, the protection of consti-
tutional values, and ensuring that constitutionally-based legal norms are cor-
rectly applied-could pertain to most any legal concept implicating constitu-
tional rights or obligations that are not defined solely by the precise language of
the relevant constitutional clause. 31 One most certainly could apply identical
reasoning to justify independent appellate judgments on intentional race dis-
crimination findings. This point becomes clear when tracing the roots of actual
malice and intentional discrimination concepts.
Both actual malice and intentional discrimination have similar roots in the
line of English cases involving scienter and the law of deceit.232 The antecedents
of race discrimination prohibitions lay in common law and go far back to be-
fore the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights statutes. 33
Before this, at least thirty-two states had codified antidiscrimination provisions
in their innkeeper statutes. 3 4 The Supreme Court itself has recognized that ra-
cial discrimination proscriptions have shared histories with the common law
torts of insult and indignity 35 and has characterized intentional discrimination
as "tantamount to malice. "236
Considering the historical roots shared by actual malice and intentional
discrimination, one must ponder whether something about the respective
structures of the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment would account
230. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 232-33 (2006); Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501
U.S. 1030, 1038 (1991).
231. Allen & Pardo, supra note 12, at 1776.
232. Bose, 466 U.S. at 502 n.io.
233. The language of the Thirteenth Amendment incorporates that of the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, which proscribed slavery and involuntary servitude. The pri-
mary effect of the ordinance was the creation of the Northwest Territory as the
first organized territory of the United States out of the region south of the Great
Lakes, north and west of the Ohio River, and east of the Mississippi River. On Au-
gust 7, 1789, the U.S. Congress affirmed the Ordinance with slight modifications
under the Constitution. Richard L. Aynes, Unintended Consequences of the Four-
teenth Amendment and What They Tell Us About Its Interpretation, 39 AKRON L.
REV. 289, 303 (2006).
234. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 260 (1964).
235. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974).
236. Courts have referred to the term "intent" as "invidious" discrimination on par
with "animus, malice, or a conscious awareness." Selmi, supra note 3o, at 288; Sie-
gel, supra note 196, at 1134-35 (discussing Feeney, which parses motive, intent, and
volition).
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for the double standard. The First Amendment is widely interpreted as creating
positive rights,237 while the Equal Protection Clause is seen as creating a negative
right, i.e., to be free from discrimination.23' Actual malice establishes a protec-
tive boundary around those venerable First Amendment guarantees. Intentional
discrimination, on the other hand, prosecutes a right in the face of a presump-
tion of nondiscriminatory animus. What the Equal Protection Clause obligates
(that is, not to discriminate), however, is no less a constitutional imperative
than First Amendment guarantees.
Thus, the Court's "protecting constitutional values" justification simply
begs the question. The protected value is rooted in general federalism principles
and the power of the Court to unify legal norms. An intentional race discrimi-
nation finding also triggers a constitutional right, i.e., to be free from such dis-
crimination. It therefore is difficult to see why the Court deems actual malice
doctrine more worthy of constitutional protection than intentional discrimina-
tion.
If the values protected by the legal concepts arguably are of the same consti-
tutional importance, then perhaps a difference between how actual malice and
intentional race discrimination concepts are substantiated from an evidentiary
perspective might account for the differential treatment. Constitutional malice
is defined as a knowing or reckless disregard of the falsity of statements made of
or concerning a person.2 39 Constitutional malice can also be found where the
defendant engaged in "highly unreasonable conduct" in his investigation and
reporting. 4° In judging whether the defendant evinced knowing falsity, reckless
disregard, or even unreasonable behavior, the trial court is charged to deter-
mine whether the "defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth
237. See Orville Lee, Legal Weapons for the Weak? Democratizing the Force of Words in
an Uncivil Society, 26 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 847 (2001) (arguing that access and en-
hanced participation are positive rights which maximize the First Amendment's
right to free speech). But see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutionalizing Women's
Equality, 90 CAL. L. REV. 735 (2002) (stating that judges often feel that positive
rights are outside of their ability to enforce).
238. See Roberto J. Gonzalez, Cultural Rights and the Immutability Requirement in Dis-
parate Impact Doctrine, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2195, 2226 n.136 (2003) (arguing that it
makes sense to structure equal protection as a negative right since it sometimes is
difficult to measure baseline discrimination against a person or group); Robert F.
Williams, Foreword: The Importance of an Independent State Constitutional Equal-
ity Doctrine in School Finance Cases and Beyond, 24 CONN. L. REV. 675, 696-97
(1992) (stating that the Equal Protection Clause has been applied most often as a
negative right).
239. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964); see Elder, supra note
226, at 600.
240. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
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of his publication."2 4' In doing so, the trial judge can make factual findings on
any subjective animus the defendant may have had towards the plaintiff.24
Alternatively, the trial judge, in reaching a constitutional malice determina-
tion, can find that a defendant engaged in a course of conduct in spite of its ul-
timate impact, namely publishing a false statement. In other words, reckless be-
havior can be proffered to evidence actual malice.2 43
On the other hand, in trying to prove racial discrimination, evidence dem-
onstrating "reckless disregard" or the entertainment of serious doubts about the
impact of one's behavior that resulted in discrimination can never carry the
day. As the majority in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney in-
sisted, intentional discrimination is not so calibrated or nuanced; "[i]t either is
a factor that has influenced [a decision] or it is not.12 44 Thus, despite the fact
that actual malice and intentional discrimination historically are commonly
rooted in scienter and deceit doctrines, the range of probative evidence demon-
strating actual malice is greater. That seemingly sensible contrast also manifests
the substantive injustice that occurs when refusing to apply the constitutional
fact exception to intentional race discrimination findings in two important
ways. First, a core tenet of antidiscrimination adjudication is to "select from the
maze of human behaviors those particular practices that violate the principle,
outlaw the identified practices, and neutralize their specific effects."2 45 The task
of the trial judge is to ferret out the perpetrator of discrimination.2 46 In looking
for race-dependent decisions made by the perpetrator, the court must look to
fault. To do so, the trial court must not just examine whether the perpetrator
proceeded on a course of conduct with a purposeful desire to create discrimina-
tory results. The court must also explore which aspect, if any, of that person's
conduct contributed to the violation. 47
If it is true that a court's role in discrimination cases is to identify from "the
maze of human behaviors" the cause of the discrimination, then it becomes ap-
parent that intentional race discrimination has as many permutations in possi-
241. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
242. Elder, supra note 226, at 555-60o (summarizing libel cases since Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931)).
243. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
244. Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 277 (1979).
245. Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscririna-
tion Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1054
(1978).
246. See id. at 1056. Freeman critiques the perpetrator perspective that antidiscrimina-
tion cases have reinforced. Id. at 1052-57. While acknowledging that antidiscrimi-
nation adjudication focuses on individual harm and a co-extensive remedy for the
harm, he urges an expanded vision that antidiscrimination proscriptions should
achieve, i.e., a focus on the broader conditions of racial discrimination.
247. Id.
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ble evidence presented as actual malice. To be sure, most discrimination is not
the result of conscious, direct malice or bigotry but instead arises out of more
subtle, complex motivations.248 Stereotyping, unexamined or implicit bias,2 49
aversive racism, 5 ' or mixed-motive cognitions are each a form of discrimina-
tion marked by some degree of illicit volition. In addition, racially discrimina-
tory effects arise not only from intentional acts but also acts taken without re-
gard to their impact. The Supreme Court has rejected evidence of disparate
impact or negligent discrimination as independent proof of an equal protection
violation."' Furthermore, the Court has failed to embrace the theory of negli-
gent discrimination as grounds for an equal protection claim. 52 By viewing in-
tentional discrimination as a binary phenomenon (either it has influenced a de-
cision or not), the Court has foreclosed the incorporation of other evidence of
discrimination into race discrimination jurisprudence.
Second, the notion that discrimination either exists or not unjustly cabins
intentional discrimination within the clear error standard of review framework.
248. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899,
903 (1993) (reviewing studies on stereotyping to theorize that many acts of racist
behavior may be motivated by unconscious racism).
249. Unlike traditional racial discrimination, where an actor actively and consciously
discriminates against someone based on her race, unconscious bias takes place
without the actor even knowing that he may be "treating others differently even
when [he is] unaware that [he is] doing so." Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein,
The Law ofImplicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969, 969 (2006); Charles R. Lawrence III,
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REV. 317, 319 (1987) ("Improper motives are easy to hide. And because
behavior results from the interaction of a multitude of motives, governmental of-
ficials will always be able to argue that racially neutral considerations prompted
their actions.").
250. Aversive racism has much in common with unconscious bias. Aversive racism
suggests an inner conflict between denying personal prejudice and unconscious
negative feelings and beliefs. Ian F. Haney L6pez, Institutional Racism: Judicial
Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 1O9 Yale L.J. 1717, 18o8 n.349
(2000) (describing the aversive racism thesis as positing "that Whites experience
anxiety and discomfort (rather than overt hostility) in the presence of minorities
because of a conflict between consciously held egalitarian norms and unacknow-
ledged racial biases"). Far from wearing hoods or burning crosses, aversive racists
"support policies that promote racial equality and regard themselves as not preju-
diced" but at the same time experience feelings of uneasiness in the presence of
African-Americans and tend to engage in racial discrimination when there are
"race-neutral justifications for their behavior." Leland Ware, A Comparative
Analysis of Unconscious and Institutional Discrimination in the United States and
Britain, 36 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 89, 113 (2007).
251. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 (1976).
252. Oppenheimer, supra note 248, at 972 (analyzing employment discrimination ju-




While there are compelling reasons for treating the legal concept itself as a con-
stitutional fact subject to independent appellate judgment, to incorporate the
subtler, more complex motivations into intentional race jurisprudence would
fortify significantly the appropriateness of engaging in the fullest appellate re-
view. Evidence pointing to aversive racism, implicit bias, and even discrimina-
tory racial impact findings can be characterized more easily as constitutional,
sociological, or legislative facts warranting full appellate review. Moreover, ap-
pellate courts even may introduce such evidentiary propositions in the first in-
stance of appeal.
The Court allows reckless acts to serve as a basis for applying the constitu-
tional fact doctrine to actual malice claims. Similarly, the Court should confer
the same normative framework to allow for full inquiry into the question of
whether a perpetrator engaged in a course of conduct without regard for its ra-
cially discriminatory effect or could not justify the rationality of his course of
conduct. 53 If the Court is to be consistent doctrinally, it should allow for the
myriad forms of discrimination to undergo independent appellate judgment.
B. Actual Malice and Intentional Race Discrimination-An Institutional
Values Critique
An examination of the actual malice and intentional race discrimination
doctrines demonstrates their similarities in many respects, and yet we are still
left without a satisfactory answer as to why they are subject to different stan-
dards of review. Consequently, we must revisit the institutional values that mo-
tivated Rule 52(a)'s passage. As stated earlier, the application of any articulated
standard entails consideration of the underlying policies and their application
to the immediate factual situation. By evaluating these values-respective tri-
bunal competencies, administrative efficiencies, and doctrinal coherence-one
can assess whether it makes sense to apply independent appellate judgment to
actual malice but not to intentional race discrimination.
With actual malice, the Supreme Court weighs the institutional interests in
a way that requires a departure from the clear error standard. As the Court ex-
plained in Bose, resort to the constitutional fact exception for actual malice de-
terminations privileges doctrinal coherence by furthering accurate law applica-
tion, law declaration, and norm development. Any presumption of finality that
would attend trial court fact finding under Rule 52(a) is disregarded. In other
words, the decision to exercise independent appellate judgment ensures that ac-
tual malice doctrine evolves in a unified, orderly manner. Devalued in the insti-
tutional interests balancing are administrative efficiencies. Because litigants ef-
fectively are given another opportunity to have facts reheard, trial court
determinations are reevaluated (thus adversely impacting comity between the
253. See Freeman, supra note 245, at 1o98 (interpreting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971) to require that ostensibly race-neutral practices with disparate ra-
cial impacts be rationalized).
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tribunals),25 4 and direct economic and temporal costs to appellate tribunals and
litigants are increased. Moreover, if one accepts the premise that trial judges are
more competent to make the witness credibility assessments that often mark
actual malice determinations, the risk of error costs, i.e., a wrong decision, in
appellate exercise of independent judgment is also sublimated in favor of ensur-
ing doctrinal coherence.
Yet, with its fidelity to the clear error standard for intentional race dis-
crimination findings, the Court instead has balanced institutional interests in a
manner that sacrifices doctrinal coherence for administrative efficiencies. Clear
error review lowers direct economic and temporal costs because of the primacy
placed upon the finality of trial court findings on intentional race discrimina-
tion claims. Litigants and trial courts save time and money due to the limited
ability to engage in a subsequent, independent review of factual findings. Appel-
late courts also run more efficiently if the scope of appeals is narrower. Tribunal
comity is enhanced, but, in contrast to actual malice evidentiary findings, deci-
sional error costs are weighed in favor of the presumption that the trial court is
best positioned to make credibility and demeanor assessments. With intentional
race discrimination findings, the apparent conclusion is that independent ap-
pellate judgment would ensure neither the accuracy of decisions nor the confi-
dence in outcomes.
Credibility and demeanor evaluations are the persistent arguments in favor
of clear error review for intentional race discrimination determinations. But,
the Bose Court was undaunted by the task of making those assessments in order
to expose the author's motives. Trial judges are undoubtedly better positioned
to assess motivation from testimonial responses, rebuttals, vocal tone, nuances,
and visual reactions. And, of course, "any inquiry into a person's motivation or
mental state (such as intent or knowledge) is necessarily complex, context-
specific, and depends upon application for shape. 255 Those complexities obtain,
though, regardless of whether the trial judge is considering what a stereo critic
meant when he wrote that the sound emanating from a Bose loudspeaker wan-
dered "about the room" or whether considering an employer's testimony on his
reasons for firing his only African-American employee.
From an intentional discrimination perspective, clear error review impedes
the ability to develop a more robust intentional discrimination doctrine. The
Court's refusal to integrate the more nuanced, complex forms of race discrimi-
nation into intentional discrimination doctrine deprives courts and society of
unified, coherent legal norms of constitutional dimension. 56 Were such ques-
254. Adamson, Ideological Weapon, supra note 24, at 1O81 (claiming that appellate re-
evaluation undermines the presumption that trial courts are more competent
fact-finders and that trial courts may perceive review as second-guessing).
255. Allen & Pardo, supra note 12, at 1776.
256. Professor Linda Hamilton Kreiger compares Title VII race discrimination claims
with those based on age discrimination and the varying types of proof needed.
While rejecting that implicit racial bias could operate in discrimination, Kreiger
notes that the Seventh Circuit embraced such a possibility in age discrimination
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tions fully reexamined on appeal, race discrimination doctrine would develop
in a way that more broadly encompasses the forms of discrimination as citizens
experience them. 57 By extension, giving doctrinal coherence to a broadened
understanding of intentional race discrimination would lower direct and social
costs by offering stability and predictability to the constitutionally proscribed
contours of race discrimination. At the same time, the Supreme Court could
further federalism interests and solidifies its authority as the final arbiter of
matters directly affecting constitutional rights.
C. The Subtle Vices of Passive Virtues
Appellate courts have weighed the institutional values of Rule 52(a) in a
manner favoring certain constitutional rights and obligations over others. By
discussing the double standard existing between actual malice and intentional
race discrimination, one can examine whether Rule 52(a), by its own terms,
perpetuates a substantive injustice with respect to race discrimination claims.
Finally, one can assess whether the refusal to apply the constitutional fact doc-
trine (and the independent appellate judgment standard) in the intentional race
discrimination setting reinforces any of those substantive injustices.25 s
1. Enforcing Passive Virtues Through Rule 52(a)
Rule 52(a) operates in a way so that its essential terms-"facts," "findings,"
"oral or documentary evidence," and "clear error"-ensure that intentional
race discrimination findings never will receive the benefit of thorough appellate
consideration.25 9 This is so not only under circumstances in which intentional
race discrimination is explored from the perspective of the perpetrator's mo-
claims. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1161 (1995). But see Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 925 (6th Cir.
1984) (quoting 113 Cong. Rec. 34,742 (remarks of Rep. Burke)) ("Unlike race dis-
crimination, age discrimination may simply arise from an unconscious application
of stereotyped notions of ability rather than from a deliberate desire to remove
older employees from the workforce.... ").
257. Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 183 (2004). Solum
correctly states: "We want outcomes that are substantively just, judgments that
are legally correct, and findings that are factually true." Id. at 184. Moreover, fair
procedures "must, at a minimum, strike a fair or reasonable balance between the
benefits of accurate outcomes and the costs imposed by the system of proce-
dures." Id. at 185.
258. Roy L. BROOKS, CRITICAL PROCEDURE 43 (1998).
259. RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUC-
TION 26 (2001). Words and institutional racism influences the law, its language,
and legal structures. By extension, it influences the content of procedural rules. Id.
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tives and decisional impacts but also when claims are based upon its more sub-
tle forms. What follows is a parsing of Rule 52(a)'s operative terms.
Scholars have noted that the adjudicative processing of "facts" fails to cap-
ture adequately the discrimination experience. 6 ° Every litigant comes to the
courthouse armed with a construct of the experience bringing him or her there
in the first place. That construct is "any artificial, causal, or interdependent ar-
rangement of facts, factors, elements, or ideas that flows from our inner aware-
ness.
' 261
It is the individual's construct of the racial grievance that must receive pri-
mary consideration in the adjudicative setting. Overt racial discrimination
might be seen readily by others. Yet, not all forms of racial discrimination are
viewed as "fact" in a manner that the law is equipped to accept. Stories of or by
discrimination victims are not always reductive; they can be intangible and hard
to pin down . 6 ' Even the term "intentional" discrimination fails to capture fairly
the experience of victims of unconscious or implicit bias or aversive racism. As
a result, intentional discrimination, broadly understood, is more difficult to
capture authentically in the adjudicative setting.263 If a racial grievance cannot
be constructed adequately as a "fact" in the more traditional, epistemological
sense of being tangible and objective, the result can be the labeling of authentic
grievances as opinion, perspective, or worse: imagination. Consequently, the
term "fact" might fail to capture legitimate forms of discrimination that cannot
be objectified easily.
Finding a fact adds another layer to the quandary. First, to construct a find-
ing of fact requires that a judge do more than simply identify and describe a
"reality"; it requires that the judge interpret, choose among, make inferences
from, and synthesize data and then evaluate and articulate one or more "rele-
260. See, e.g., D. Marvin Jones, The Death of the Employer: Image, Text, and Title VII, 45
VAND. L. REV. 349, 363 (1992) ("The individual employer's state of mind, his mal-
ice or irrationality, is not the source of the injured victim's discrimination experi-
ence.").
261. Reginald Leamon Robinson, Human Agency, Negated Subjectivity, and White
Structural Oppression: An Analysis of Critical Race Practice/Praxis, 53 AM. U. L.
REV. 1361, 1368 (2004).
262. See Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race
Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1261 (1993);
Gregory J. O'Meara, S.J., The Name Is the Same, but the Facts Have Been Changed
To Protect The Attorneys: Strickland, Judicial Discretion, and Appellate Decision-
Making, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 687, 692 (2008) ("[T]he law is built around the facts
found in a case; facts cannot be analyzed because they consist of matters beyond
the courts' control. A close study of narrative theory undermines seeing facts in a
case as either bit players or insurmountable forces of nature.").
263. One author has posited that if racism is often unconscious, employment dis-
crimination should be seen more as negligence than intentional action. Oppen-
heimer, supra note 248.
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vant realities." 264 Human beings are limited by what they believe, and those be-
liefs are articulated as reality.265 In the adjudicative context, those articulations
shape one of the competing realities a trial judge must embrace if he is to ar-
ticulate findings. From the perpetrator's perspective, race-dependent actions or
omissions-whether intentional, negligent, or reckless-constitute the other
competing reality.
Finding a fact also requires an act of reductionism that, if successful, cap-
tures the subordinating experience in a manner that is intellectually and mor-
ally accessible. The subordinating experience may manifest itself in its inten-
tional, negligent, reckless, or more subtle forms. If the trial judge cannot or
refuses to legitimize the discrimination experience, then that experience will not
emerge in a manner that truly does justice to the wound.266 For those reasons,
competent appellate review of the myriad forms of intentional race discrimina-
tion is contingent upon, and ultimately defeated by, the a priori "finding of
fact" requirement of Rule 52(a).267
Decisions interpreting Rule 52(a) further reinforce its deterministic nature.
In a relevant case, the Supreme Court reminded appellate judges that their ut-
most fidelity is to the rule: "[A]pplying the clearly erroneous standard to the
findings of a district court sitting without a jury, appellate courts must constantly
have in mind that their function is not to decide factual issues de novo." 26s Going
further, Justice White in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. reminds
appellate judges that a tie goes to the trial judge: Even in instances "where there
264. Adamson, All Facts, supra note 24, at 631 (citing Emmet T. Flood, Note, Fact Con-
struction and Judgment in Constitutional Adjudication, iOO YALE L.J. 1795, 18o8-13
(1991).
265. See Robinson, supra note 261, at 1371.
266. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Foreword: What Clients Want, What Lawyers Need, 52
EMORY L.J. 1053 (2005); Jim Chen, Poetic Justice, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 581 (20o6);
Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards
an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992); Russell G.
Pearce, White Lawyering: Rethinking Race, Lawyer Identity, and Rule Of Law, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 2081 (2005); Marjorie A. Silver, Emotional Competence, Multi-
cultural Lawyering and Race, 3 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 219 (2003).
267. Appellate judges and federal courts have acknowledged in varying ways the role
that implicit bias and stereotyping may play in racial discrimination. See, e.g., Rice
v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 343 (20o6) ("How can trial judges second-guess an instinc-
tive judgment the underlying basis for which may be a form of stereotyping in-
visible even to the prosecutor?") (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Miller-El v.
Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 267-68 (2005) ((Breyer, J., concurring)); Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244, 300-01 (2003) ("'Bias both conscious and unconscious, reflecting
traditional and unexamined habits of thought, keeps up barriers that must come
down if equal opportunity and nondiscrimination are ever genuinely to become
this country's law and practice."') (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 274 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
268. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (emphasis added).
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are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them
cannot be clearly erroneous. '26 9 Add to these admonitions the fact that they ap-
ply regardless of whether the evidence is in oral, documentary, or some other
form. These directives fortify the injustices inherent in Rule 52(a)'s terms.
Those admonitions act as checks on appellate court judges even under circum-
stances for which intuition, common sense, human experience, equal appellate
competence (to review documents or even make credibility determinations),
and even resort to another rule (such as the constitutional fact exception)
would provide the better answer.
The hortative directives offered by the Supreme Court reinforce the sub-
stantive injustice of Rule 52(a). That the rule must guide appellate judges-that
there can be no clear error even if there is another view to be had-even if the
appellate court is as in as good a position to evaluate the evidence as the trial
court was means this: Appellate judges might see race discrimination (overt or
subtle, conscious or unconscious) after reviewing the evidence (for clear error),
yet they cannot come to a conclusion contrary to one trial judge's and provide
relief to a substantial injustice.
In contrast, under the de novo or independent appellate judgment review
standard, any presumptive correctness of a trial judge's determinations is mi-
nimal or nonexistent. Indeed, under the latter standard, appellate judges have a
constitutional obligation to disregard the trial court's factual determinations.
Although one can see that Rule 52(a)'s operative terms cannot capture effec-
tively intentional discrimination in all of its forms, applying the constitutional
fact exception to such grievances would help to ensure that appellate courts are
receptive to developing more vigorous, textured legal norms that inform inten-
tional discrimination doctrine.
2. Engaging Active Virtues Through the Constitutional Fact Excep-
tion (Some of the Time)
With intentional race discrimination findings, appellate courts enforce a
narrow construction of the constitutional fact exception in a bow to judicial
minimalism and passive virtues.2 7 By hewing to the clear error standard, how-
269. 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969) ("The authority of an appellate court, when reviewing the
findings of a judge as well as those of a jury, is circumscribed by the deference it
must give to decisions of the trier of the fact, who is usually in a superior position
to appraise and weigh the evidence.").
270. At least one author has asserted in the past that that the selective deployment of
the constitutional fact doctrine or, conversely, the enforcement of the clear error
standard can be guided by ideological biases. Adamson, Ideological Weapon, supra
note 24 at 1o82. Attitudinal and personal interests can and do play a role even
when deciding on matters of procedure. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 64-65, 206 (1993)
(demonstrating the degree to which the ideological attitudes and values of Su-
preme Court justices influence their preferences on procedural tasks such as cer-
tiorari decisions and opinion writing).
28:1 2009
CRITICAL ERROR
ever, those courts simultaneously marginalize and depreciate minority griev-
ances.27'
Many scholars have lamented that the nascent Equal Protection Clause did
little to ensure that African-Americans would receive equal treatment.2 7 While
the Equal Protection Clause is regarded justifiably as one of the most significant
laws to benefit minorities, subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence has erected
burdens that impede realization of its true purpose. Scholars have criticized the
intent requirement to establish equal protection violations and the minimized
probative force of demonstrated disparate racial impact evidence. 73 To be sure,
as recently as the October 20o8 Term, the Court established in Ricci v. DeSte-
fano274 a relaxed standard for demonstrating reverse discrimination and seemed
poised to deem unconstitutional any consideration of disparate racial impact
whatsoever. Concurring in this Title VII reverse discrimination case, which
considered white New Haven firefighters' challenging the City's nullification of
promotion test results demonstrating that they had outperformed African-
American firefighters, Justice Scalia warned that "the war between disparate
impact and equal protection will be waged sooner or later." 75 He observed that
"Title VII not only permits but affirmatively requires such [remedial race-based
considerations] when a disparate-impact violation would otherwise result. ' '276
Title VII's "disparate-impact provisions place a racial thumb on the scales, often
requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies, and to
make decisions based on (because of) those racial outcomes. That type of racial
decisionmaking is, as the Court explains, discriminatory. ' 77
271. Kang, supra note 25, at 972 (arguing that passive virtues "forsake[] the constitu-
tional rights of those on the outside to promote the constitutional rights of those
situated more toward the inside") (footnote omitted).
272. Such has been the result even though its drafter, John Bingham, made clear that
the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to ensure that every person, "no
matter whether an Asiatic or African, a European or an American sun first burned
upon them" would be equal in the eyes of the law. Aynes, supra note 233, at 304.
Justice Miller, in the Slaughterhouse cases, conceded that African-Americans
would benefit from the Equal Protection Clause. Id. Yet, between 1873 (the year of
the Slaughterhouse cases) and the decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896),
only 15 of the 15o Fourteenth Amendment cases before the courts involved Afri-
can-Americans. Id.
273. See, e.g., Christopher P. Banks, The Constitutional Politics of Interpreting Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 425 (2003); Melissa Hart, Subjec-
tive Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741 (2005).
274. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
275. Id. at 2683 (Scalia, J., concurring).
276. Id. at 2682.
277. Id.
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Others scholars have noted the toughened burdens of proof imposed, par-
ticularly in the employment discrimination context7 8 Added is the burden of
demonstrating the presence of subtler forms of discrimination. Although the
phenomena of unconscious or unexamined racial bias and aversive racism in-
creasingly have been documented and verified, discrimination claims on those
grounds remain difficult to sustain. As Justice Scalia portends, openly consider-
ing merely the racial impact of one's decisions will be per se unconstitutional. It
is enough that intentional race discrimination now must be proven to show an
equal protection violation; 79 that barrier rises even higher because intent find-
ings are filtered invariably through Rule 52(a)'s clear error standard with no
recognition as constitutional fact."' °
Professor Laurence Tribe has advocated that appellate courts remain flexi-
ble in their use and application of procedural rules."s' "Structural due process"
already is implicit in some of the constitutional doctrines that we ordinarily
treat either as aspects of substantive due process or as parts of procedural due
process. An unyielding application of the clear error standard improperly con-
cretizes (and thus legitimates) majoritarian principles. It does so by reaffirming
the philosophy that undergirds judicial minimalism, i.e., that the role of courts
should be a modest one, leaving issues of race and rights to the arena of delib-
erative politics and constituent majorities. An unyielding refusal to acknowl-
edge other forms of intentional race discrimination also concretizes
majoritarian viewpoints on the meaning of intentional race discrimination.
Case-by-case decisionmaking requires a court to resolve a dispute on its
own terms while articulating some coherent explanation for the decision
reached. Where the issues at hand are flexible, such as the constitutional fact
doctrine or the meaning of intentional discrimination, those decisionmakers
should adopt decisional approaches that are as open as possible. Once consen-
sus amongst appellate tribunals has united around additional themes that in-
278. See Michael Selmi, Subtle Discrimination: A Matter of Perspective Rather than In-
tent, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 657, 657-60 (2003). The issue is exacerbated further when
one considers that certain evidentiary findings are reviewed only for abuse of dis-
cretion.
279. Siegel, supra note 196, at 1136 ("[T]he discriminatory purpose requirement now
insulates many, if not most, forms of facially neutral state action from equal pro-
tection challenge.").
280. The Supreme Court's position regarding intentional race discrimination is even
more worrisome when one considers its affirmative action jurisprudence. Intent
determinations are virtually absent in claims of reverse discrimination. Thus, al-
though anti-affirmative action grievances warrant not only independent, but also
strict scrutiny, intentional race discrimination findings fall victim to the "non-
presumption of animus" underpinnings of Davis. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson,
"Unexplainable on Grounds Other than Race": The Inversion of Privilege and Sub-
ordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 664-65.
281. Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, io HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975).
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form intentional race discrimination, the judicial system then can incorporate
broader, bright-line norms and per se rules.
Time and again with regard to racial justice, appellate courts have ceded to
the countermajoritarian difficulty. The belief that somehow independent appel-
late judgment on intentional race discrimination findings is inappropriate, if
not unnecessary, is grounded largely in the notion that only trial judges have
the capacity and can be trusted to hold actors to their constitutional obligations.
To allow for appellate review of race discrimination findings only on the nar-
rowest grounds ignores the critical role appellate courts have played in the ad-
vancement of minority rights.2
The presumption of nondiscriminatory animus on the part of those creat-
ing or implementing facially neutral laws, regulations, or policies places those
denied their constitutional rights at a proof disadvantage from the start. Fur-
thermore, the intentional discrimination requirement has the effect of aborting
proof of and remedy for the countless examples of the racially discriminatory
impact of ostensibly neutral laws, regulations, or policies."3 The refusal to con-
fer constitutional fact status to intentional race discrimination findings rein-
forces the difficulties placed in the way of historically subordinated groups, re-
trenches majoritarian principles surrounding race and discrimination, and adds
to the now legion indicia of the Supreme Court's retreat from hearing and al-
lowing for redress of those grievances.
282. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 683 ("Laws enforcing segregation existed through-
out the South and likely would have lasted long beyond their invalidation by the
Supreme Court if it had been left to the political process.").
283. Hutchinson, supra note 280, at 666-67 (noting that evidence of disproportionate
impact alone, while not irrelevant, no longer can carry the day under equal pro-
tection jurisprudence). Even though evidence of disparate impact can be prof-
fered to demonstrate intentional discrimination circumstantially, "doctrinal ex-
plications of 'discriminatory intent' after Davis and Arlington Heights seem to
close whatever room these cases provided for utilizing impact evidence to prove
intent." Id. at 667. Chemerinsky also notes that that trial judges often fail to ar-
ticulate findings of fact in a manner that will shield them from appellate review.
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2008,
2026 (2002) (arguing that Supreme Court opinion rhetoric often fails to "articu-
late its standards in a consistent manner and to follow consistent approaches to
interpreting particular constitutional provisions"). Moreover, appellate judges of-
ten fail to explain their choice of standard of review and the decisional tools used
to arrive at that choice. When an appellate court exerts its power to depart from
Rule 52(a)-and then fails to express its reasoning with clarity-it makes the deci-
sional outcome look lot like whimsy or worse. See Adamson, Ideological Weapon,
supra note 24, at 1082.
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D. Consequences of Active Virtues for Intentional Race Discrimination Fac-
tual Determinations
As we have seen, appellate courts possess the authority to exercise inde-
pendent judgment over findings of intentional race discrimination. The Su-
preme Court could determine, once and for all, that intentional discrimination
findings are constitutional facts that demand independent appellate judgment,
as it has done with the actual malice doctrine. Alternatively, trial court evidence
of racial discrimination through implicit bias or aversion also could be reviewed
as ultimate, legislative, or sociological facts warranting full review. Moreover,
like appellate opinions that discuss stereotyping and its pernicious manifesta-
tions, judicial notice can be taken by appellate courts. In this manner then-
whether labeled as a mixed question of law and fact, an ultimate fact, even a
law-legislative or sociological fact-the trial court's factual findings would re-
quire, at a minimum, independent review.
Imagining a world in which intentional race discrimination factual deter-
minations are regarded as constitutional facts for purposes of appellate review
entails consideration of tradeoffs. There are several. One tradeoff would require
consideration of who is entitled to have factual determinations in race discrimi-
nation cases reviewed independently and under what circumstances. Crafting
the emergent rule asymmetrically, an argument might be made that independ-
ent appellate judgment should occur only when a trial court has found no in-
tentional discrimination. Such an approach might seem unworkable and fun-
damentally unfair. Another attractive, yet fundamentally unfair, consideration
would be to mandate that independent appellate judgment should follow only
when the grievant is a member of a historically subordinated group.25 4 After all,
if the fundamental concern is ensuring that procedures are implemented to al-
low for outsider voices to be heard and that decisions made adversely to those
outsiders are accurate, then one crafting the rule asymmetrically would worry
less about trial decisions that vindicate majoritarian interests (e.g., the employer
or the municipality).5 Such a selective application of an independent judgment
standard for intentional race discrimination findings, however, would be im-
practical and fundamentally unfair. The ideal proposition would be applying
the independent judgment standard in the same manner to intentional race dis-
crimination factual findings regardless of the outcome and regardless of the sta-
tus of the grievant or defendant.
284. Cf BROOKS, supra note 258. This re-imagination of Rule 52(a) applies critical race
theory concepts of asymmetry and standpoint. Asymmetrical construction of a
law, or, in this case, a standard, envisions a model of equality where it is assumed
that minorities are differently situated in society, and thus the rule should be de-
signed (or interpreted) to compensate for racial disadvantage. Id. at 16. This Rule
52(a) construction also responds to the interpretation that it fails to give voice
adequately to outsiders' perspectives of racial grievances. Id.
285. Id. at 24-26.
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A second tradeoff would be the diminution of comity between the courts.
Under an independent appellate judgment standard, trial judges' factual find-
ings would no longer carry presumptive correctness for intentional race dis-
crimination cases. As a result, trial judges may be subject to less regard by the
litigants before them and may perhaps suffer morale issues as they see what was
once their fact-finding province arrogated further by appellate judges. On the
other hand, with a bright line judgment that intentional race discrimination
findings are constitutional facts, trial judges eventually would yield to the un-
derlying rationale for treating them as such.
A third significant tradeoff would be the increased direct economic and
temporal costs. Those costs would be borne both by litigants and the appellate
system. An abiding concern with appellate courts always has been their casel-
oads.286 More specifically, scholars have noted an apparent effort by courts over
time to limit the scope of relief available in discrimination claims due to the
sheer numerical magnitude of such cases and the potential strains on the trial
and appellate dockets. 87 The Supreme Court itself has remarked upon this con-
cern. In her Hernandez concurrence, Justice O'Connor worried about a rule al-
lowing for discrimination determinations based solely on proven racially dispa-
rate impacts "would give rise to an unending stream of constitutional
challenges." 'ss It is a mark of intellectual dishonesty if concern for the number
of possible constitutional grievances is part of a spoken or unspoken rationale
for restricting questions of constitutional magnitude to clear error review.
To treat intentional race discrimination findings as constitutional facts for
independent judgment would require litigants and the courts to invest more
time and resources in prosecuting claims. Appellate dockets and time needed to
try cases certainly would swell. At the same time, expenses incurred at the trial
court level would increase if litigants fail to prosecute cases with the vigor they
otherwise might exert. Conflicts in outcomes for intentional race discrimina-
286. See Ruggero I. Aldisert, Perspective from the Bench on the Value of Clinical Appel-
late Training of Law Students, 75 Miss. L.J. 645 (20o6); Paul R. Michel, The Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Must Evolve To Meet the Challenges Ahead, 48
AM. U. L. REV. 1177 (1999); Carl Tobias, Chief Judge Martin and the Modern Sixth
Circuit, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1059 (2000); J. Jason Boyeskie, Comment, A Matter of
Opinion: Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Citation to Unpublished Opi-
nions, 6o ARK. L. REV. 955, 961 (2008) (noting a seventy-seven percent increase in
cases appealed between 1988 and 20o6). The concern is hardly new. The increasing
complexity and volume of litigation "[s]harply curtailed" appellate review as early
as the 184os. Clark & Stone, supra note 34, at 200.
287. Supporters of the intent requirement in discrimination cases cite the costs of im-
pact alone and the burdens on appellate courts. Issacharoff, supra note 204, at 336
(suggesting that, in the face of "the sheer magnitude of cases and the limits of the
appellate docket," one response is to "reduce the scope of relief is to redefine what
constitutes the violation").
288. Hernandez v. New York, 5oo U.S. 352, 374 (1991) (O'Connor, J. concurring).
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tion claims within circuits would add to the direct costs, as those conflicts
would require reconciling.
Direct costs incurred by litigants are no small issue-particularly with poor
plaintiffs prosecuting discrimination claims. Furthermore, it is no small thing
to minimize the doubtless administrative efficiency and system costs that would
come from treating intentional race discrimination findings as constitutional
facts. Those costs can be foreseen readily. The Supreme Court, however, could
have foreseen its inability, as a matter of unerring principle, to justify why cer-
tain constitutional rights deserve more vigilant protections than others.
CONCLUSION
What appears on the surface as a principled, minimalist application of Rule
52(a)'s clear error mandate in intentional race discrimination cases is in fact a
selectively passive application of a procedural rule. Whether driven by pragma-
tism or ideology, this approach is neither doctrinally nor institutionally defen-
sible. The passive treatment of intentional race discrimination determinations
ultimately impairs the ability of appellate courts to ensure that the constitu-
tional principles undergirding the Fourteenth Amendment are upheld. So here
lie the subtle vices of passive virtues with respect to Rule 52(a), intentional
discrimination, and the constitutional fact doctrine.
First, findings regarding intentional race discrimination and actual malice
are constitutional facts. The invariable application of Rule 52(a) to intentional
race discrimination findings signifies an ill-considered balancing of institutional
values that privilege administrative efficiencies and costs over decisional accu-
racy, doctrinal coherence, and substantive justice. The Supreme Court's faulty
balancing illustrates again that ostensibly neutral, nonsubstantive objectives
such as institutional competence and decisional accuracy are never neutral.
Second, the Supreme Court has failed to clarify its independent appellate
judgment standard and why it does not apply to all constitutional facts. By re-
fusing to acknowledge the constitutional significance of intentional race dis-
crimination findings, the Supreme Court deprives discrimination jurisprudence
of robust doctrinal norming when a more sensible and consistent approach
could develop a body of law drawing fully upon the actual complexity of facts
and considerations involved in intentional discrimination cases. Although cases
must be decided on their own terms, appellate courts must be able to adopt
rules of decision that ensure both substantive and procedural due process. Only
through a determination that intentional race discrimination findings are con-
stitutional facts will the Court articulate proper legal norms that can guide fu-
ture cases and behaviors.
Finally, Rule 52(a) is a vital procedural tool that serves to legitimize the trial
and appellate processes. All litigants deserve outcomes that are legally correct.
Equally important is the fact that litigants deserve assurance that the procedural
rules have been applied fairly and equitably. When the Court purports to apply
the same procedural rule yet uses it passively towards intentional race discrimi-
nation and actively towards other constitutionally critical issues, it delegitimizes
28:1 2009
CRITICAL ERROR
the adjudicative process. The double standard critically delegitimizes the sub-
stantive outcomes as well. Those aggrieved come to perceive-rightly or wrong-
ly-that procedural tools are employed in outcome-determinative ways and
that appellate courts are failing to vindicate constitutional rights as to race with
the vigor they exert over other constitutional claims.
Appellate courts are obliged to ensure decisional accuracy and confidence
in outcomes. Where constitutional rights are at stake, no obligation rises higher.
It is a simple truth that trial courts do not always arrive at the right decisions.
Of course, allowing independent appellate judgment or independent review of
intentional race discrimination factual findings would not necessarily ensure
correct or even fair results. Yet the application of Rule 52(a)'s constitutional fact
exception to such findings can ensure results that are, at bare minimum, consis-
tent within the Supreme Court's jurisprudence.

